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I. INTRODUCTION: ADOPTING A DEMAND-SIDE PERSPECTIVE
Articles describing change in the legal profession normally use lawyer

self-reports as evidence. In fact, when voices outside the profession are heard,
descriptions of the profession are transformed.! Self-reports, of course, are suspect
evidence. 2 The self-reports of elite actors, like lawyers, are especially suspect, for
often they are speeches to an audience (other than the interviewer).3 If lawyers are
not always selling themselves, at least some always speak for the record to
promote their interests.
Another method for evidencing change in the legal profession tests
lawyer self-reports by other evidence. 4 This Article interprets lawyer self-reports

and summaries of lawyer self-reports by utilizing information about how
companies organize themselves to use legal services. Not the incidence of, but the
structure of, client demand is used to analyze reports of changes in the
organization of corporate legal services.5
In approximately the last twenty-five years, the corporate bar has changed
dramatically in response to changes in how companies use lawyers. For example,
changes in corporate organization of legal departments transformed both what
work outside counsel performed and the organization of outside law firms.6 The

1.

See, e.g., DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHIcAL STUDY (1988)

(listening to third parties); Lucie E. White, Subordination,Rhetorical Survival Skills and
Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G, 38 BUFF. L. REv. 1 (1990) (listening to
clients). See generally Anthony V. Alfieri, Impoverished Practices, 81 GEo. L.J. 2567
(1993) (describing the transformative practice of hearing silenced and marginalized voices).
2.
Cf FED. R. EviD. 803(6) (self-serving statements).
3.

See CHRIS ARGYRIS,

UNDERSTANDING ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR 40

(1960); Daniel Lerner, Interviewing Frenchman, 62 AM. J. Soc. 187 (1956).
4.
For example, to understand the changing roles of inside counsel, in addition
to interviewing inside counsel, one also may speak to managers and outside counsel who
have had a course of dealing with the interviewed inside counsel. Such interviews, placing
the inside counsel within a causal chain, permit examination (and sometimes corroboration)
of inside counsel's self-reports, for example, about how they served the corporate client's
interests and exercised increased responsibilities. I followed this approach in previous
works. See Robert Eli Rosen, The Inside Counsel Movement, ProfessionalJudgment and
OrganizationalRepresentation, 64 IND. L. J. 479 (1989) [hereinafter Rosen, Inside Counsel
Movement]; Robert Eli Rosen, Problem-Setting and Serving the Organizational Client:
Legal Diagnosis and Professional Independence, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 179 (2001)
[hereinafter Rosen, Legal Diagnosis]; Robert Eli Rosen, The Responsible Organization of
Corporate Legal Services (1984) (unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, University of California,
Berkeley, on file with author and also available from University of Michigan Dissertation
Services, 300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106) [hereinafter Rosen,
Responsible Organization].
5.
Cf. Carl Landauer, Beyond the Law and Economics Style: Advancing
CorporateLaw in an Era of Downsizing and Corporate Reengineering, 84 CAL. L. REV.
1693 (1996) (book review) (criticizing corporate law academics for ignoring consequences
of corporate redesign).
6.
ROBERT L. NELSON, PARTNERS WITH POWER: SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF

THE LARGE LAw FIRM (1988); Robert A. Kagan & Robert Eli Rosen, On the Social
Significance of Large Law Firm Practice,37 STAN. L. REV. 399 (1985); Jeffrey S. Slovak,

2002]

WE'RE ALL CONSULTANTS NOW

639

recent past suggests that a demand-side perspective best explains the market for
corporate legal services. 7 Hence, to predict the future of corporate legal practice, a
good place to
8 begin is to examine the direction of change in how company clients
use lawyers.
The changing use of lawyers by clients is understudied. 9 To advance such
studies, in addition to anecdotal evidence, 0 this Article presents an interpretive
reconstruction of management rhetoric. This Article analyzes some recent
organizational development literature authored by both consultants (who are
carriers of change) and academics (who are sometimes just observers of change)."
Admittedly, this literature, even when it claims to describe instances of
actual change, is not the best evidence of how companies are changing. 12 In
Workingfor CorporateActors: Social Change and Elite Attorneys in Chicago, 1979 AM. B.

FOUND. RES. J. 465.
7.
Ronald J. Gilson, The Devolution of the Legal Profession: A Demand Side
Perspective, 49 MD. L. REV. 869 (1990).

8.
This Article is largely restricted to considering client demand for
transactional work. I follow the old law firm divide between corporate and litigation work.
Litigation work for companies is only incidentally described in this Article. But see infra
text accompanying notes 153, 262-63. By adopting a demand-side approach, I deny neither
the explanatory importance of other bases for legal professionalism, see, for example, W.
Wesley Pue, "Trajectoriesof Professionalism?": Legal Professionalismafter Abel, 19 No.

3 MAN. L.J. 384 (1990), nor the ability of agency (self-determination) to respond to context,
rather than be determined by it.
9.
There are important exceptions, however. See generally YVES DEZALAY ET
AL., DEALING IN VIRTUE: INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE
CONSTRUCTION OF A TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER (1996); LAw AND TECHNOLOGY IN THE

PACIFIC COM11tUNITY (Philip S.C. Lewis ed., 1994); AUSTIN SARAT & WILLIAM FELSTINER,
DIVORCE LAWYERS AND THEIR CLIENTS: POWER AND MEANING IN THE LEGAL PROCESS
(1995); John Flood, DoingBusiness: The Management of Uncertaintyin Lawyers' Work, 25
LAW & Soc'Y REV. 41 (1991); Robert L. Nelson & Laura Beth Nielsen, Cops, Counsel, and
Entrepreneurs:Constructing the Role of Inside Counsel in Large Corporations,34 LAw &
Soc'Y REV. 457 (2000); and economic explorations that use client demand as an
independent variable.
10.
In 1994, while a visitor at Stanford Law School, I revisited five of the six
corporations studied in Rosen, Responsible Organization, supra note 4. (One had relocated
from the Bay area). I'd like to thank the Stanford Law School, and, among others, Dean
Brest, Deborah Rhode, William Simon and particularly Robert Gordon. In 1994, I did not
receive the cooperation from the legal departments that I had received in the early 1980s.
Due to this lack of cooperation, I did not speak with enough individuals to find anything but
anecdotes. Like the cited articles from legal newspapers, the interviews conducted in 1994
present instances from which trends are inferred [hereinafter 1994 Interview].
11.
This Article seeks to correct for my not having spoken to the managers with
whom the lawyers worked in 1994. Inside counsel were much more protective of their
relationships with managers than they had been in the early 1980s. In 1994, I knew that
inside counsel was talking a different game, in which corporate social responsibility was not
a move. Like Nelson & Nielsen, I concluded that "there has been a historical shift in the
ideology and practices of inside counsel that maps onto historical changes in the ideology
and practices of corporate management." Nelson & Nielsen, supra note 9, at 490.
12.
The relationships between rhetoric and reality are complex. The
decentralizing management rhetoric reviewed in this Article can be used to increase
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particular, this literature over-samples large and "hot" companies, especially ones
from the "information industry." Assuredly, some companies have and are
changing in ways this literature seeks to describe and advance. The extent of these
changes, however, is not documented here. This Article assumes that companies
re-organize to conform
to what are conceived to be the best managerial practices.
13
Rhetoric has power!
The aim of this Article is to map out a possible future for corporate legal
services. This future appears to be emerging, but is still nascent. The future
described in this Article need not be our future. Social change is not deterministic.
This Article is not an argument for this future; indeed, it is an argument against it. I
do not explore the positive gains, especially economic ones, made possible by this
imagined future. My concerns are the impediments this future presents to legal
professionalism and its regulation. This Article aims to be hypothesis generating,
not hypothesis validating. If it succeeds,14it will stimulate further work to explore
the issues that this possible future raises.
"We're All Consultants Now" means that corporate legal services are
changing because corporate clients are organized to use lawyers as they use any
consultant. Lawyers may continue to supply specialized technical services, but that
work will be integrated into the company's decision-making as a consulting
service. To the company, the legal department becomes just one internal
consulting group among others and outside law firms become just one type of
professional service firm. "We're All Consultants Now" also means that legal
departments and law firms are re-organizing themselves to supply what
corporations seek from consultants. For the largest law departments and firms, this
means imitating the consulting divisions that have been attached to the large
accounting firms. Smaller law departments and firms will organize themselves on
the model of other consulting firms.
To explain why "We're All Consultants Now," Part II analyzes four
current organizational strategies: downsizing, outsourcing, self-managing teams,
and porous borders. Part III, using M&A practice as an example, describes how
companies redesigned by these organizational strategies use lawyers as
consultants. Part IV(A) discusses how legal departments are re-organizing to serve
company teams and how outsourcing leads to legal departments losing their role as
gatekeepers of outside legal services. Part IV(B) examines how inside and outside
counsel relations are developing by a "partnering" model as companies re-organize
to have porous borders and utilize outsourcing strategies. Part V(C) discusses how
corporate law firns are re-organizing themselves to serve company teams, creating
bureaucratic controls. See Joan E. Manley, Negotiating Quality: Total Quality Management
and the Complexities of TransformingProfessional Organizations,15 Soc. F. 457 (2000).
13.

JEFFREY PFEFFER, NEW DIRECTIONS FOR ORGANIZATION THEORY

64-79

(1997). See generally CRITICAL CONsuLTING: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON THE MANAGEMENT

ADVICE INDUSTRY (Timothy Clark & Robin Fincham eds., 2002) [hereinafter CRITICAL
CONSULTING]. As lawyers and those who are denied privileges know, language matters.

14.

Cf. Walter W. Powell, The Capitalist Firm in the Twenty-First Century:

Emerging Patterns in Western Enterprise, in THE TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY FIRM:
CHANGING ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION IN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 33, 36 (Paul

DiMaggio ed., 2001).
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"The Age of the Minders," and responding to outsourcing by selling both services
and products. This Article concludes with questions for future research.

II. ORGANIZATIONAL STRATEGIES
"Throughout much of the economy, and especially among new firms,
hierarchies are flatter, headquarters staff smaller . . . and people's careers
increasingly span business units and firms.' Employees experience "less secure
internal labor markets, more fluid job defimitions, and more ambiguous reporting
relationships" instead of "the rules of clarity and commitment" of bureaucratic
organizations.6 These changes result from companies implementing four strategies
of organizational development. In organization literature, these strategies are
differently named and differ in their details, as each consulting guru seeks to
comer a market. In this Article, the strategies are named "downsizing,"
"outsourcing," "self-managing teams," and "porous borders."
A. Downsizing and Self-Managing Teams
The term "downsizing" refers to organization-wide firings, otherwise
known as reductions in force. Corporate downsizing supposedly reduces bloated
bureaucracies and eliminates deadwood bureaucrats, that is, middle managers and
headquarters' staff.17 As one lawyer in 1994 told me, the goal of downsizing was
to "get rid of the military chain of command thing, the vertical silos" of different
departments.' 8 Downsizing supporters disparage specialization, the self-sufficiency
of technical competence, uniform policies, and standardized procedures. They also
target a hierarchical accountability structure, where "coordination" is "done from a
level or more above the work being coordinated."' 9 Employees have to be
can become
downsized (i.e., fired), we are told, so that the remaining employees
"empowered" by dismantling the organization's bureaucracy. 20

15.

Paul DiMaggio, Introduction:Making Sense of the ContemporaryFirm and

Prefiguring Its Future, in THE TwENTY-FmRsT-CENTURY FIRM: CHANGING ECONoMIc
ORGANIZATION IN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECrIVE 3,26 (Paul DiMaggio ed., 2001).

16.
Id. at5.
Downsizing can be understood as part of a larger movement, which includes
17.
privatizing government, that might be named the "Critique of Bureaucracy Movement."
Robert Eli Rosen, Breaking Through Bureaucracy and Democratic Participation (April
1993) (presented at University of Illinois Conference on "Community Empowerment and
Economic Development," April 1993) (unpublished paper, on file with author).
18.
Cf PETER F. DRUCKER, MANAGEMENT CHALLENGES FOR THE 21sT CENTURY
30-34 (1999); R. Whitley, Firms,Institutions and Management Control: The Comparative
Analysis ofCoordinationand ControlSystems, ACCT. ORG. & Soc'Y, July 1, 1999, at 507.
GIFFORD PINCHOT & ELIZABETH PINCHOT, THE END OF BUREAUCRACY AND
19.
THE RISE OF THE INTELLIGENT ORGANIZATION 23 (1994).

20.

"Mhe iron fist of intensification and job insecurity is softened as well as

strengthened by the velvet rhetoric of 'self-actualization' and the opportunity to work for

'meaning as well as money' . . . cement[ed] together . . . [by] the ideology of
entrepreneurialism." David Knights & Hugh Willmott, The ReengineeringRevolution? An

Introduction, in THE REENGINEERING REvOLUTION? CRITICAL STUDIEs OF CORPORATE

CHANGE 1, 7 (David Knights & Hugh Willmott eds., 2000) (internal citation omitted).
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There are pathologies of bureaucracy, such as when bureaucracy's formal
structure is used to evade responsibility or employees work according to the
bureaucracy's rules rather than the task to be accomplished.' In fact, the changing
role of corporate legal departments in the 1980s was accompanied by arguments
22
that powerful inside lawyers were needed to respond to bureaucratic pathologies.
in
the
Consequently, corporate legal departments that had been re-organized
1980s, I hypothesized, would be less23 affected than untransformed departments by
downsizing's attack on bureaucracy.
Nonetheless, the legal departments I re-examined in the mid-1990s all
had experienced at least one wave of downsizing. Legal department downsizings
appeared to have no relation to whether they had been redesigned in the 1980s.
Many downsizing cuts were corporate "across the board" ones. For example, at
one company, all departments (including legal) were first cut ten percent, then
another five percent. As this company's legal department had been re-organized in
the 1980s, I asked why the General Counsel did not argue that the legal department
had already attacked bureaucracy. The answer I received was that internal politics
24
made it necessary for all departments to "share the pain equally., Inside counsel
expressed the hope that re-hiring would not be across-the-board, because their
department had already been re-organized. In the redesigned company, however,
re-staffing after downsizing depends on responding not to the defects of
bureaucracy, but to the needs of self-managing teams.
Organization downsizing was accompanied by implementation of the

organizational strategy of managing transactions by self-managing project teams.2
Bureaucratic pathologies were understood to require organizing project teams, in
which technical specialists work not as part of their disciplinary group, but as
members of a team; standardized procedures and policies are replaced by a
See Guy BENVENISTE, PROFESSIONALIZING THE ORGANIZATION: REDUCING
21.
BUREAUCRACY TO ENHANCE EFFECTIVENESS (1987); Rosen, Legal Diagnosis,supra note 4,
at 186-91.
Rosen, Inside CounselMovement, supra note 4, at 510-25.
22.
Judging by the corporate legal departments I studied in the early 1980s,
23.
downsizing attacks straw-bureaucracies. Contra PINCHOT & PINCHOT, supra note 19, at 184
("[t]he law department had come to represent some of the worst traits of bureaucracy").
Pinchot & Pinchot describe the re-organization of a law department unaffected by the Inside
Counsel Movement. Their law department is re-organized by the four strategies described in
this Article. The improvements of the re-organization they describe, however are ones that
were also claimed in the 1980s. Compare id. at 186 ("Trivial repetitive tasks were turned
over to clerks with boilerplate contacts. 'Cover your ass' requests for opinions declined 70
percent ... Lawyers began appreciating delivering value.") with Rosen, Inside Counsel
Movement, supra note 4, at 508-09, 522 n.168, 516.
Inside counsel's acceptance of across-the-board cuts also reflected and
24.
advanced the view that law is just one information technology among others and legal risks
are just one set of risks among others. See infra Part 1I(B).
The combination of downsizing and team strategies produced resistance by
25.
workers to self-managing teams, who initially saw them as a means for further layoffs.
Debra L. Shapiro & Bradely L. Kirkman, Employees' Reaction to the Change to Work
Teams: The Influence of 'Anticipatory' Injustice, 12 J. ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE MGMT. 51
(1999).
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commitment to innovation and employee rights; and coordination by the hierarchy
is constrained by a commitment to the teams being self-managing. z6
Instead of bureaucratic controls, the supervision of project teams is done
by the teams themselves and by hierarchical review of risk-management reports,
which the project team writes, at least, in part. By shifting from bureaucratic
organization to one based on self-managing project teams, the company shifts
away from a "transmission belt" delegation of powers from principal to agent
towards one that emphasizes "network coordination." In network coordination,
hierarchical authority is exercised through the management of risks and the
pronouncement of abstracted (flexible) visions and values and horizontal authority
is informal, emphasizing personal responsibility and team cohesion. Company
workers are not to be reduced to mere followers of instructions, but rather treated
as "professionals," directed by desired results and esoteric symbolic structures.28
"[F]ired up, highly cohesive" teams regulate professional work.29
Best team practices have emerged, further specifying the team model of
organizational design. The promoted best practices for team development include:
1. Teams Should Be "ProjectTeams'"
"Projects replace 'jobs' as the basic unit of work.' 30 In organizational
terms, the move is "[f]rom function to process" in which units are "organized
around delivering customer oriented outputs. '' 31 Narrow job descriptions are
rejected. 32 Contributing to a team requires "role flexibility. '33 The lawyer's kiss-

26.
Thomas A. Stewart, Planning a Career in a World without Managers,
FORTUNE, Mar. 20, 1995, at 72.
27.
PINCHOT & PINCHOT, supra note 19, at 37.
28.
See generally BENVENISTE, supra note 21. To understand being directed by
"esoteric symbolic structures" consider that lawyers are directed not only by client
objectives but also by something that might be called "the law." Because the law is both
esoteric and symbolic, it is open to multiple interpretations and contains multiple voices.
29.
Richard W. Woodman & William A. Pasmore, The Heart of It All: Groupand Team-Based Interventions in Organization Development, in ORGANIZATION
DEVELOPiENT; A DATA-DRIVEN APPROACH TO ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE 164, 166 (Janine
Waclawski & Allan H. Church eds., 2002). "[T]eams... are typically ...collections of
individuals whose working relationships require close coordination, higher levels of
cooperation, greater cohesiveness, and the like." Id. at 176 n.1. Cf.David Hechler, Enron's
Legal Staff Battered, Confused, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 4, 2002, at Al, All ("There was a real
esprit de corps" and "You just walked into the lobby and you felt electrified).
30.
DiMaggio, supra note 15, at 26.
31.
Knights & Willmott, supra note 20, at 3.
32.
Paul DiMaggio, Conclusion: The Futures of Business Organization and
Paradoxes of Change, in THE TwENTY-FIRST-CENTURY FIRM: CHANGING ECONOMIC
ORGANIZATION IN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 210, 210-11 (Paul DiMaggio ed., 2001);
see DAVID H. MAISTER, TRUE PROFESSIONALISM: THE COURAGE TO CARE ABOUT YOUR

PEOPLE, YOUR CLIENTS, AND YOUR CAREER (1997).
33.

(1978).

GORDON LIPPITr & RONALD LippiTT, THE CONSULTING PROCESS IN ACTION 37
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off, "that's not my job, 34 is what team members should not say.35 All team
members are expected to have "responsibilities with bottom-line implications." To
meet these, "they become partners
in designing their own roles and expanding the
36
nature of their contributions."
2. Some Teams Should Be MultidisciplinaryTeams
Those assigned to project teams "develop[] a network of relationships that
reach across functions," "plan[] and implement ideas that transcend their
functions," and "practic[e] strategic thinking."3 7 In the sphere of production, multidisciplinary teams break bureaucracy's sharp distinction between conception and
execution. Teams "de-couple" functional specialists, like lawyers, from their
specialization, thus reducing bases for conflict.38 Lawyers on multidisciplinary
teams no longer have the privilege to say, "This is the legal department's (or my
law firm's) position on this issue."3 9
Before redesign, companies affirmed the "bureaucratic 'art of
separation.' 40 The bureaucratic divisions of office and hierarchy enable roledifferentiation; this is my office in this place in the hierarchy. Role-differentiation
creates role moralities, where different norms emerge for different roles, creating
role conflict. 41 On teams, role conflicts are suppressed.
3. Teams Should Be Self-Managing
Teams "want to be able to do the problem solving themselves." They
want to be able to "change the assumptions and see how [different solutions to the
problem] play out."' 4 2 With teams, "supervision, responsibility, and even discipline,
is... shifted from managers to peers." 43 In the redesigned company, "[e]mployee
accountability shifts from hierarchy to collegiality.... ."4 "Team leaders tend to be
34.
William H. Simon, Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and
ProfessionalEthics, 1978 WIS. L. REv. 29, 74 n.100.
35.
"Turf battles get eliminated" as one lawyer told me in 1994. Or, as another
said, "there's no buck-passing" on teams. See 1994 Interview, supra note 10.
36.
Raymond E. Miles & W.E. Douglas Creed, Organizational Forms and
ManagerialPhilosophies:A Descriptive and Analytical Review, 17 RES. IN ORG. BEHAV.
333, 362 (1995).
37.
RAM CHARAN ET AL., THE LEADERSHIP PIPELINE: How TO BUILD THE
LEADERSHIP-POWERED COMPANY 67 (2001).

38.

Henry Mintzberg, Covert Leadership, Notes on ManagingProfessionals, in

MANAGING INTHE NEW ECONOMY 133, 137-43 (Joan Magretta ed., 1999).

39.
See supra text accompanying note 37; infra text accompanying note 211.
40.
Paul du Gay, Making up Managers: Enterprise and the Ethos of
Bureaucracy, in THE POLiIcs OF MANAGEMENT KNOWLEDGE 19, 31 (Stewart R. Clegg &
Gill Palmer eds., 1996).
41.
LUBAN, supra note 1,at 107-11.
42.

JAMES

O'SHEA

&

CHARLES

MADIGAN,

DANGEROUS

CONSULTING POWERHOUSES AND THE BUSINESSES THEY SAVE AND RUIN 293

COMPANY:

THE

(1997)

43.
Powell, supra note 14, at 58.
44.
Knights & Willmott, supra note 20, at 5. The redesigned organization is
premised on there being an inverse relation between risk-taking, innovative behavior and
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much younger than the previous supervisors, and work with the staff, rather than
simply supervising or directing them;45 they do not have a management title or the
trappings of prestige that go with it."

Teams are their own bosses, they both direct their work and decide how
bonuses are to be distributed. Teams change the individuals with whom team
members interact and those by whom they are evaluated. 46 "Team members must
agree on who will do particular jobs, how schedules will be set and adhered to,
what skills need to be developed, how continuingmembership
''7 in the team is to be
earned,and how the group will make and modify decisions.
Supervisors only covertly manage teams:
Managers cannot bring out the intelligence of everyone in the
organization if they pretend they can do better thinking in a few
hours than a project team that has wrestled with the problem for
months. Instead of issuing arbitrary orders, they need to raise
concerns and trust the project team to find a way of handling them
that integrates with all the other issues guiding the design.48
Executives also are disconnected from project teams. 49 In the redesigned
company, executives let teams plan the transactions themselves.50 The task for

formal conflict resolution, coordination procedures. Henry W. Chesbrough & David J.
Teece, When is Virtual Virtuous? Organizingfor Innovation, HARv Bus. REv., Jam-Feb.

1996, at 65.
45.
Darren McCabe & David Knights, 'Such Stuff as Dreams are Made On':
BPR Up Against the Wall of Functionalism, Hierarchy and Specialization, in THE
REENGINEERING REVOLUTION? CRITICAL STUDIES OF CORPORATE CHANGE 63, 77 (David

Knights & Hugh Willmott eds., 2000). Nonetheless, in some team redesigns, "team leaders
have disciplinary powers." Id. When they do, team leaders fulfill many of the functions
once performed by bureaucratic controls, "[t]o a considerable extent the role of team leader
embodies that of assistant manager, chief clerk, and supervisor; it reproduces rather than
removes these roles." Id.
46.
Self-management often is linked to claims about the "empowerment of
workers." I do not consider this here because I think it is a deceptive concept, especially
when applied to lawyers. This empowerment discourse assumes that the worker lacks any
"distinctive personal [or professional] values." Knights & Willmott, supra note 20, at 12.
Some literature distinguishes "empowered teams" from "self-managing teams," for
example, by emphasizing that empowerment means the "team's experiencing its tasks as
important, valuable, and worthwhile." Bradley L. Kirkman & Benson Rosen, Beyond SelfManagement: Antecedents and Consequences of Team Empowerment, 42 ACADEMY MGMT.

J. 58, 59 (1999). 1 assume that the best practices for self-managing teams include such
dimensions of empowerment.
47.
PINCHOT & PNCHOT, supra note 19, at 205 (source omitted) (emphasis
added).
48.
Id. at 34.
49.
SUSAN ALBERS MOHRMAN & SUSAN G. COHEN, When People Get Out of the
Box, in THE CHANGING NATURE OF WORK 365, 372 (Ann Howard ed., 1995).
50.
Thomas M. Hout & John C. Carter, Getting it Done: New Roles for Senior
Executives, HARV.Bus. REV., Nov.-Dec. 1995, at 133 ("The traditional hands-on role of the
senior manager is disappearing. The message seems to be: Get the processes right, and the
company will manage itself.") See also id. at 133 (criticizing this message because it
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corporate management is to "manage[] an economy., 51 Corporate executives
review risk-management reports for each team's project and select which projects
will be implemented.
If a team's project is selected, executives tarn
implementation back to the team.
4. Team Members Should Be Ensnaredin Ian MacNeil's "Entangling
53
Strings" oflTnterdependence,Friendship,and Reputation
Team members should "feel and act as if they have ownership of the
project."5 4 Team members should "buy into" the project, developing and
protecting the project as if it were their own property.5 On the dark side, the
entangling strings may mean that assertions of professional ethics are treated as
"ethiscuity," the "taking of refuge in ethics in order to protect oneself from
potentially threatening and anxiety-producing relationships. 56 According to the
proponents of redesign, the team's operating principle should be "team above
personal interests. 57 For professionals, including lawyers, teams "promote[
loyalty to the project group with which the professional is associated.., subject
the professional to greater scrutiny by the project manager [and other team
members]... [and] as potential consumers of functional services," the team has the
power to influence58the professional's rewards from this project as well as future
work assignments.
5.Teams Should Have the Choice To Use EitherInternalor External
Experts
For example, outside counsel "may function as integral members59of the
team, in addition to performing specific professional services as outsiders."
Redesigning work for self-managing teams did not protect law
departments from further downsizings. 60 Some further downsizings of staff are
ignores the need to manage political conflicts); Kurt Eichenwald, Another Quality of the
CorporateTitan:Ignoranceat the Top, N.Y. TIMES, March 3, 2002, § 4, at 3.
51.
Miles & Creed, supra note 36, at 356.
52.
See infra text accompanying notes 124-29. Corporate executives also
manage the corporate economy by managing corporate finance, such as M&A work, and
choosing organization designs. J.C. Spender & P.H. Grinyer, OrganizationalRenewal: Top
Management'sRole in a Loosely Coupled System, 48 HUM. REL. 909 (1995).
53.
Ian R. MacNeil, Relational Contract Theory as Sociology: A Reply to
ProfessorsLindenberg and de Vos, 143 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL EcoN. 271, 275
(1987).
54.
Ross DAWSON, DEVELOPING KNOWLEDGE-BASED CLIENT RELATIONSHIPS:
THE FUTURE OF PROFESSIONAL SERVICES 149 (2000).
55.

DAVE ULRICH ET AL., RESULTS-BASED LEADERSHIP 102 (1999).
LIPPIT & LIPPITT, supra note 33, at 74 (citation omitted).

56.
57.

Id. at 68-74.

58.

JOSEPH A. RAELIN, THE CLASH OF CULTURES: MANAGERS AND PROFESSIONAL

231 (1986).
59.
Joseph M. Morris, Mergers and Acquisitions, in
BUSINESS ADVISOR 299, 303 (William K. Grollman ed., 1986).
60.
PINCHOT & PINCHOT, supra note 19, at 190.
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caused by the fifth best practice of teams, their ability to utilize and even bring
external workers onto the teams. This best practice exemplifies the organizational
strategies of outsourcing and treating the company as having porous borders, the
subjects of the next part.
B. Outsourcingand Companies' PorousBorders
Having downsized, outsourcing recommends that companies use nonemployee workers on a project basis.6 1 Today, "many basic organizational
functions are either outsourced or done collaboratively with outsiders. 62
When you think of downsizing, think of workers re-hired on a contingent
basis, with fewer benefits, especially health insurance. But think also of outside
counsel. In the redesigned company, "outside counsel" are "outsourced counsel."63
Outside counsel gain work through the downsized numbers of inside lawyers.
Outside counsel also gain work when the company implements an outsourcing
strategy. More generally, the organizational strategies of downsizing 64and
outsourcing link corporate demand and the supply offered by consulting firms.
The proponents of outsourcing advance the arguments outside counsel
proposed, unsuccessfully, in the face of the Inside Counsel Movement. 65 The
proponents argue that outsourcing makes economic sense because the outsourced
work is done by firms that have heavily invested in R&D, are experienced in a
variety of approaches, and can deliver, in short time frames, the highest quality
work. Like many outside law firms, consulting finns hold themselves out as
meeting each of these characteristics. It is difficult to ignore, therefore, the selfinterest organizational development experts who work for multidisciplinary
consulting firms have in companies adopting outsourcing strategies. Nonetheless,
the consulting firms are successfully convincing clients to implement outsourcing

61.
DiMaggio, supra note 15, at 26.
62.
Powell, supranote 14, at 64.
63.
Outsourced legal work came from not only downsizing the legal department,
but also downsizing legally trained corporate employees working elsewhere in the
company.
64.
"At the moment, the glue that keeps the client-consulting relationship
together is the fact that both parties 'buy into' the same business model." FIONA
CZERNIAWSKA, MANAGEMENT CONSULTANCY IN THE

21 ST CENTURY 16 (1999).

65.
Compare Emily Barker, Greener Pastures, AM. LAw., Oct. 1998, at 64
("catalyst of transactions," "helping a CEO think about the direction of the company," not
"brought in after the decisions were made," and "data gathering") with Rosen, Inside
Counsel Movement, supra note 4, at 484-90.
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strategies. 66 This is the age of consultants. The management
consultant business is
67
booming and consultants have "increasing influence."
Unlike the arguments against the Inside Counsel Movement, the
arguments for outsourcing include two accounts of the importance of inside staff.
68
First, outsourced consultants leave inside staff an important place at the table,
never denigrate inside staff, and insist that outside consultants are only needed "to
supplement in-house skills." 69 Second, outsourced consultants, as part of their
commitment to serve (by adding value to) the client, promise to educate internal
staff.70 The proponents of these organizational strategies argue that inside and
outside consultants should be partners.71
Outsourcing proponents speak a great deal of "cosmopolitan professional
judgment" (state-of-the-art service, worldwide access to information, etc.). 72 They
do not emphasize "independent [from the client] professional judgment," as did
outside counsel in response to the Inside Counsel Movement. In the literature
66.
CZERNIAWSKA, supra note 64, at 5 (explaining outsourcing as a cause of the
expansion of consulting in the 1990s). In thel980s, consulting expanded by broadening the
services offered, increasing the use of information technology and globalizing. Id.; see also
ELAINE BIECH, THE BUSINESS OF CONSULTING: THE BASICS AND BEYOND 4 (1999).
Given their clear self-interest, consultants' successes have been explained in ways
familiar to the legal post-modem literature, with emphases on rhetoric, drama and the
persuasive power of narrative. See generally CRITICAL CONSULTING, supra note 13.
67.
Robin Fincham & Timothy Clark, Introduction: The Emergence of Critical
Perspectives on Consulting, in CRITICAL CONSULTING, supra note 13, at 1, 1-4 (industrywide revenues of $3 billion in 1980 and $60 billion in 1999); see also DENIS SAINT-MARTIN,
BUILDING THE NEW MANAGERIALIST STATE: CONSULTANTS AND THE POLITICS OF PUBLIC

SECTOR REFORM IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 41-47, 57 (2000); Timothy Clark &
Graeme Salaman, Telling Tales: Management Consultancy as the Art of Story Telling, in
METAPHOR AND ORGANIZATIONS 166 (David Grant & Cliff Oswick eds., 1996).
68.
Usually at a team table.
69.
Fincham and Clark, supranote 67, at 4. Consultants are called in because the
client "has a personnel shortage," "lacks the expertise to do the job" and "has a deadline to
meet." GREGORY F. KISHEL & PATRICIA GUNTER KISHEL, CASHING IN ON THE CONSULTING
BOOM 405 (1985).
70.
O'SHEA & MADIGAN, supra note 42 ("involve the client's employees in the
engagement"). Outsourcing is accompanied by the motto: "The Intelligent Corporation is
The Learning Corporation." In the learning corporation:
Clients are finding increasingly that knowledge transfer from their
professional suppliers is the primary differentiating factor in the value
they receive, and they are switching from suppliers that insist on the
black-box model of services to those that add greater value by increasing
transparency or focusing specifically on knowledge transfer.
DAWsON, supra note 54, at 23. Cf CZERNIAWSKA, supra note 64, at 14 (stating that
consultants "are accused of not working effectively with client staff.").
71.
See infra Part IV(B). The outsourcing literature, however, also stresses the
benefits of flexible and contingent external relations. Larry Rittenberg & Mark A.
Covaleski, Internalization Versus Externalization of the Internal Audit Function: An
Examination of Professional and OrganizationalImperatives, 26 ACCT. ORG. AND SOC'Y
617, 621-23 (2001) (summarizing the literature).
72.
Cf. Alvin W. Gouldner, Cosmopolitans and Locals: Toward an Analysis of
Latent SocialRoles 1, 2 ADMIN. Sci. Q. 281 (1957).
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reviewed, when independent professional judgment is discussed, "independence"
usually means "independence from other clients" and its value derives from
outside consultants being permitted to engage in relationships that a lawyer would
regard as at least a potential conflict-of-interest. Thereby, value is added to the
client through the consultants' knowledge of the activities of competitors, usually
called consultants' knowledge of the best practices. 73 Otherwise, only in the
context of political battles within the company, is the fact of independence from
the client marketed.74 Sometimes, it is only the appearance of "independence" that
is said to add value to the client. 75
The concept of independence also is transformed by adopting the
organizational strategy of viewing the company as having porous borders,
sometimes called the "boundary-less" corporation. From the corporate perspective,
"[T]he strong boundaries that once separated firms have become less distinct,
while ...market transactions have become more intimate."76 The distinction
between inside and outside blurs with outsiders being part of the decision-making
team. 77 Some proponents of the porous border strategy go further and suggest
including suppliers, customers, and even competitors on the decision-making team
(sometimes only by proxy).7s "The boundaries of many firms have become so

porous that to focus on boundaries means only to see trees in a forest of
interorganizational relations." 79 Today, the most conspicuous examples of the
porous border strategy are companies using one accounting firm as both their
internal and external auditor.80

73.
ROBERT R. BLAKE & JANE
SRYGLEY MOUTON, CONSULTATION: A
HANDBOOK FOR INDIVIDUAL AND ORGANIZATION DEVELOPMENT 563 (2d ed. 1983).

Consultants sell "Keeping Up with the Companies You Think are Hot." See id. at 4
("Keeping up with the Joneses").
74.
When the client "wants to avoid a[n internal] conflict," "is experiencing a
crisis," "wants to avoid going through channels," or "needs an objective viewpoint" because
internal processes are not trusted. KISHL & KiSHEL, supra note 69, at 5-7.
75.
Such as when "the client doesn't want to do the job" or "wants to capitalize
on the consultant's credibility." Id. at 7, 5; see also Robert Eli Rosen, Feastingon Leftovers
...andMore: Strategiesfor Outside CorporateCounsel, 10(2) LEGAL OFF. ECON. NEwSL.
(FLA.) 6, 8 (1987).
76.
DiMaggio, supra note 15, at 4.
77.
See Raymond J. Beninato, Employee and Executive Benefits, in THE
ACCOUNTANT AS BUSINESS ADviSOR 373, 400 (William K. Grollman, ed., 1986); see also
Morris, supranote 59, at 303.
78.
DRUCKER, supranote 18, at 115.
79.
Powell, supra note 14, at 35.
80.
See, e.g., Jonathan Glater, Enron's Many Strands; Accounting; Ernst &
Young Latest Auditor Moving to Alter Some Practices,N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2002, at Cl; see
also Rittenberg & Covaleski, supra note 71. Another example may be Enron's General
Counsel's hiring Vinson & Elkins to conduct an investigation of deals in which Vinson &
Elkins had been involved. Hechler, supra note 29, at A10-Al 1. As Anderson's external
auditors could monitor the numbers generated by Anderson's internal auditors, Vinson &
Elkins could monitor deals which some of its partners advised. With porous borders,
companies include suppliers as "part" of the company and conflicts of interest supposedly
are managed.
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At the transactional level, seeing the company as having porous borders
means recognizing that transactions with outsiders are not, and need not be, armslength deals. The strategy requires company employees to manage not only what
occurs inside the company, but also that which occurs outside it. Managers are told
on the
to control outsiders principally by fostering the outsiders' dependence
8
company and particular individuals and teams within the company. '
A checklist entitled, "How boundaryless is your company?" has been
presented as an action-oriented test of the implementation of the porous borders
strategy. Among other questions, the checklist asks whether:
Decision-making is pushed down to the lowest possible level at
which competent decisions can be made. . . . Cross-functional
decisions are made through teams, horizontal organizations ...
Decision-making includes members of the value chain . . .
(including suppliers and customers).... Talent moves from one unit
to another in the organization, as needed.... Rewards (financial and
non-financial) . . . encourage cross-functional work and
collaboration ....82Rewards focus on meeting the goals set by those
in the value chain.
Like outsourcing, the porous border strategy is promoted by consulting
firms who have an interest in the outsourcing of internal functions. 83 Professional
service firms have an interest in being included within the company's "borders."
The introduction of these four organizational philosophies is not uniform
across companies. The results, at any organization, of introducing these techniques
will depend on the organization's "unique history, power players, and power
games. 84 Nonetheless, the next two sections generalize about how the
introduction of these organizational strategies influences the future of corporate
legal practice.

III. DEMAND FOR LEGAL SERVICES IN THE REDESIGNED COMPANY
This Part considers how client adoption of these organizational strategies
structures client demand for legal services. It reviews what advice this literature
provides for clients about how to manage their relations with lawyers. Although
lawyers serve the company client "as an entity,"85 how the company is organized
affects how lawyers act.86 The redesigned company challenges lawyers to respond
DRUCKER, supra note 18, at 33.
81.
82.
ULRICH ET AL., supra note 55, at 100-01.
Rittenberg & Covaleski, supranote 71, at 624-57.
83.
84.
Denis Collins, A Socio-Political Theory of Workplace Democracy: Class
Conflict, Constituent Reactions and OrganizationalOutcomes at a GainsharingFacility 6
ORG. Sci. 628, 641 (1995). Consultants protect themselves against such uncertainties by
preparing clients for the need for further consulting. See, e.g., PETER M. SENGE, THE FIFTH
DISCPLIN
146 (1990) ("To empower people in an unaligned organization can be
counterproductive.") (emphasis omitted).
85.

MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-8 (1969).

86.

MODEL RuLEs OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.

RULES].

1.13 (1984) [hereinafter

MODEL
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in different ways to the ethical dilemmas of serving organizations as clients.8 7 As a
first step in understanding these dilemmas in the redesigned company, this part
analyzes the changed context in which corporate lawyers act.
The first section of this part describes M&A (Mergers & Acquisitions)
practice, legal work in which the lawyer is thought to function as an independent
and influential counselor, possessing highly specialized expertise.88 It is an area in
which lawyers may think that their work is immune to internal corporate change
below the level of top management and the board. If changing organizational
strategies change what lawyers do in M&A work, a fortiori, changing
organizational strategies change much of corporate legal work.
The second section of this part generalizes about how redesigned
companies use lawyers. It describes how companies are being advised to manage
lawyers. It uses the redesigned company's management of legal risks as its
example. As this part shows, companies are being advised to use lawyers just like
they use any other consultant.
A. An Example: M&A Practice
If the self-report of two lawyers could be trusted, 89 an account of current
company use of M&A lawyers might be as follows: 90
An impetuous CEO of a NYSE listed corporation calls up another CEO to
broach a merger. They schedule a meeting three days later to which the other CEO
brings his outside lawyer. Not having brought her own outside lawyer along, the
proposing CEO fails to finesse an issue, causing her company significant and
precipitous expenses. 91 Like the CEO, her GC (General Counsel) fumbles the
ball.92
On the other hand, there are wise CEOs who, when troubled, first call
their outside counsel.93 It is wise for them to do so, for law provides critical
94
contingencies.
The wise CEO ensures that outside counsel is present at all
95
negotiations.

87.
Rosen, Inside Counsel Movement, supra note 4, at 536-41 (analyzing the
bureaucratic perspective of Model Rule 1.13).
88.
Flood, supra note 9. For a discussion of the independent and influential
counsel image, see Kagan & Rosen, supra note 6, at 405-11.
89.
See supra text accompanying notes 1-3.
90.
See Barry S. Alberts & Samuel Thompson, Jr., Ethics Issues Faced by
Laiwyers and Investment Bankers in Mergers and Acquisitions: A Problem Approach and
Report of PanelDiscussion, 54 U. MIAMI L. REv. 697 (1999).
91.
Seeid. at 700-01.
92.
Id. at 701 (The General Counsel inadvertently faxes to the target's outside
counsel the strategy memo).
93.
Id. at 706-07.
94.
Id. at 706.
95.
ld. at 706-07.
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In short, the whiggish tradition of lawyers displaying influential good
judgment 96 survives in self-reports by M&A outside counsel. Like whiggish
lawyers, M&A outside counsel are vitally concerned with ethics. But, as compared
to whiggish lawyers, M&A outside counsel's ethical concerns have a narrow
scope. Instead of the whiggish concern about corporate social responsibility,
today's M&A lawyers' ethical concerns are about conflicts of interest and other
law-of-lawyering problems, including problems in law firm management, such as
how to minimize associates' stealing corporate opportunities. 97
Such lawyer self-reports are suspect evidence, at least because the legal
profession has a history of whiggish self-reports that only loosely fit lawyers'
actual behaviors. 98 For present purposes, I suspect this account because, in it, the
client's organization is irrelevant. In this account, changes in client demand affect
how many calls are made for legal services, but not the work of outside counsel.
The plausibility of this account depends on important decisions about
legal work being made by the CEO or the Board of Directors. Perhaps some clients
treat their M&A activity as "bet your company" deals, in which CEOs are
intimately involved. And some CEOs may use outside counsel as their trusted
advisors. As this account presumes, lawyers can ignore clients' organizations when
lawyers are the right arms of CEOs who make the decisions. This account of M&A
work does not describe company legal work whose key decisions are not made by
the CEO. In the 99
redesigned company, remember, top executives don't manage
most transactions.
In the redesigned company, even M&A is not the CEO's baby. M&A
lawyers receive assignments from project teams, not CEOs. Companies are
advised by proponents of organizational redesign that M&A lawyers ought to be
used quite differently than lawyer self-report.
In the redesigned company, the company's outsourcing strategy shapes
demand for outside counsel services. In establishing porous borders, companies
take into account the economic interests of those to whom companies outsource
work. Consequently, the best practice for M&A work avoids contacting outside
counsel early in the deal as law finms' financial interests favor the M&A work
proceeding.' 00
In M&A ventures, the first step taken by CEOs of redesigned companies
is not to call outside counsel. The CEO's first step is to form a project team.

96.

Robert W. Gordon, The Ideal and the Actual in the Law: Fantasiesand

Practicesof New York City Lawyers, 1870-1910, in THE NEw HIGH PRIESTS: LAWYERs IN
PosT-CIvIL WAR AMERiCA 61 (Gerard W. Gawalt ed., 1984).

97.
98.
99.
100.

Alberts & Thompson, supranote 90, at 706-07.
See Gordon, supra note 96.
See supratext accompanying notes 49-52.
JOHN E. TRIANTIS, CREATING SUCCESSFUL ACQUIismoN AND JOINT VENTURE

PROJECTS: A PROCESS AND TEAM APPROACH 18 (1999). The same jaundiced scrutiny also

might be applied against law firms' responses to this exclusion, developing products for sale
(merger prospects, for example). See infra Part IV(C)(2).
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Knowing that most M&A ventures fail,' 0' the project team evaluates the project,
including the expenses of legal service, before calling outside counsel.
In the redesigned company, outside counsel should not to be involved in
initial negotiations, such as the lunch meeting between the CEOs described
above. 10 2 In fact, best practices caution against using outside counsel in any
negotiation,103 except near
1 4the end, when it is time to "squeeze the best possible
deal from the other side."'
On the other hand, porous company borders allow outside counsel to
become members of the project team when outside counsel demonstrates mastery
05
of the "complete picture of the strategic and operational gaps of the company."'
For outsourced providers to meet this requirement, they must mind the company.
Today, best practices favors the use of inside, rather than outside, counsel on
M&A project teams because outside counsel "tak[e] over [negotiations
without an]
06
... intimate knowledge of every issue that the project team has."'
The M&A project team is a multidisciplinary group whose "core team" is
composed of the team leader, "a financial analyst, a lawyer, and an operational
manager."' 1 7 The team does not include senior managers.1'8 The team decides on
the goals and objectives to be sought'0 9 and the strategy to be used." 0

101.

TRiANTIS, supra note 100, at 4.

102.
See supra text accompanying note 91.
103.
TRIANTs, supra note 100, at 199. See also id. at 196 (resisting "[o]utside
[f]orces" on negotiating team). "Do not let external consultants conduct face-to-face
negotiations on your behalf but, if necessary, use them sparingly in that capacity. Also, have
the negotiation subteam monitor [any such] discussions." Id. at 387-88.
104.
Id. at 199. Outside counsel may be brought into negotiations at an earlier
time "to bring balance in negotiations dynamics when the other side brings in" their outside
counsel "to influence the direction of discussions." Id.
105.
Id. at 18; cf 1994 Interview, supra note 10 ("In a lean and focused company,
lawyers [inside counsel] understand the company's business and its problems.").
106.
TRIANTIs, supra note 100, at 20. Using inside counsel also maximizes the
transfer to the corporation of knowledge gained about the target and from outsource
providers to the team. Id. at 20, 201.
107.
Id. at 39, 52. As a core team member, especially, the lawyer "participates in
identification of business needs to be addressed and covered through legal documents." Id.
at 296.
108.
Project, team members are drawn from different functional areas
including finance, operations, legal, technical support, marketing,
corporate planning and strategy, human resources, and public relations.
Senior managers are usually excluded from the acquisition project team
because their presence does not allow for open team communication and
interaction and their involvement results in decisions being made simply
to satisfy senior manager wishes.
Id. at 130; cf McCabe & Knights, supra note 45.
109.
TruAINs, supra note 100, at 20. Teamwork requires commitment to the team
and "it is essential that team members share common goals and objectives and maintain
continuity of purpose throughout the project." Id. at 130.
110.
Id. at56.
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The team decides on how and when to obtain assistance from internal and
external experts.' Proponents of organizational redesign advise teams to manage
outside counsel.1 2 "In every case, the role of external
' 13 advisors must be well
defined and their activities and involvement controlled."
The core team (and, in particular, the project leader) directs the use of
outsource providers.1 4 But the entire team is involved in the work. Legal work, for
example, requires obtaining "input from the [whole] team." 115 Lawyers on the
team or working for the team do not own any of the legal documents of the M&A
16
process. Each member of the team owns responsibility for the legal documents."
Any legal document's "essence is developed by the project team." ' 1 7 "It is better
for the project team to work with the lawyer to draft the proposal document, rather
than for the lawyer to draft the agreement and then seek input from the project
team."'" 8 "The business development representative on the project team also helps
to create and reviews legal documents and agreements drafted to affect the
completion of the transaction and ensure that the project objectives are met and
that the legal documents reflect the desired terms."' " 9
The legal documents that are the outputs of the process may have external
audiences, but, from the company's perspective, they also have important internal
audiences, especially the implementation, human resources, liaison, and public
relations sub-teams of the project team. Consequently, "project teams play an
important role in shaping and drafting the agreements to make them easier to
negotiate, manage, and monitor throughout their lives."' 20 And, "the project team
should ensure that legal documents contain clear language because if the project
team does not understand the language of the agreement, chances12 are the
implementation subteam [among others] cannot manage that agreement." '
Furthermore, "[n]egotiation subteams are . ..advised to simplify the
language of legal documents to the maximum extent" to prevent lawyers from

111.
Id. at 85. "The project workplan shows key activities involved in completing
the project, the subteam owning each activity and individual members responsible,
deliverables of each subteam, timelines associated with each activity, and estimated costs in
performing each activity." Id. at 133 (emphasis added).
112.
Id. at41.
113.
Id. at 199. "[1t is important to specify the functions expected to be
performed by these experts so that costs can be controlled, while maximum services are
obtained from them." Id. at 85.
114.
Id. at 181.
115.
Id. at 142.
116.
Id. at 144.
117.
Id. at 303. The team "creates the intent and business objectives, but the
lawyers are responsible for drafting appropriate language that reflects those objectives." Id.
at 41.
118.
Id. at 198.
119.
Id. at 40-41.
120.
Id. at 303.
121.
Id. at 304.
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managing the project. 122 The team, sometimes in consultation with its sponsors,
decides on negotiation commitments.12
The redesigned company accepts that project teams may lose their
objectivity. Owning the project, teams may not make "a sound evaluation of [the]
assumptions underlying" their forecasts, 124 thus preventing proper analysis of risks.
To an extent, companies rely on outside experts to manage this risk. Companies
are advised that they may need to use outside experts who understand "that [the]
company has expectations that through external advisors, an independent
assessment and objective view of the project can be obtained."'125 In such
situations, the company relies on outside counsel to be not only a haruspex, 126 a
predictor
of known risks, but also an insurance investigator, searching for hidden
127
risks.

122.
Id.
123.
The negotiation subteam reports to the core subteam, the project sponsor and
the business development group. Id. at 56. By contrast, the due diligence sub-team reports
to the financial analyst. Id. at 57. For a discussion of the role of legal due diligence in this
process see id. at 282-85. For a discussion of reporting to the financial analysts, see id. at
56, 136-38.
124.
Id. at 137. Triantis gives the following account of why objectivity might be
lost:
1. It is possible that the project team information, assessment and
analysis are erroneous or incomplete. Issues can go unchecked and
basic elements escape the project team's attention because of tight
schedules and operating under pressure.
2. Interpretation of facts may not be entirely consistent or correct. This
occurs because project team members often take definitions for
granted and these definitions are not the same across all
participants.
3. Recommended processes may not have been followed. This can
happen for a number of reasons, but is mostly traced to shortcuts
and pressures to meet deadlines.
4. Information and facts may have been omitted from the analysis.
This occurs either because of ignorance on the part of the project
team or because they were not considered important in the broader
scheme of things.
5.

Personal biases and subjective judgments. They are occasionally
introduced in the assessment process, but an independent
assessment identifies such biases and requires explanations that
satisfy impartialobservers.

Id. at 148 (emphasis added)
125.
Id. at 56. On the other hand, the best practice for responding to "team think"
is not only to rely on outside experts, but also to create a shadow team that, with no contact
with the project team, replicates the team's work. Id. at 148.
126.
Detlev Vagts, Legal Opinions in Quantitative Terms: The La'yer as
Haruspex or Bookie, 34 Bus. LAw. 421 (1979).

127.
"Evaluation of project risks.., by outside advisors... [could] identify new
risks, generate discussion, and result in more accurate quantification of risks." TRA s,
supra note 100, at 271. To perform this service, like other outside experts, outside counsel
must understand that they have to examine the problems as set for them by the team,
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In redesigned companies, the risk that project teams will not accurately
identify project risks is generally managed internally through the company's risk
management process. Teams develop "[r]isk management plans ... to deal with
unresolved issues and project risks, negotiate their allocation and sharing, and
create ways to deal with them so as to mitigate the impact or eliminate the risks
completely."' 128 Senior executives decide whether to go forward with the M&A
sometimes requiring that
deal by assessing these risk management plans,
29
independent assessments be made of certain risks.
B. Using Lawyers as Consultants
In the redesigned company, as in M&A work, lawyers may work with
project teams whenever "familiarity with basic legal skills"'130 needs to be
supplemented. Lawyers become members of the team by developing knowledge of
the company's business. Lawyers get legal work from the team, which has the
responsibility to define and control it. Companies for a long time have been
advised that, when using consultants, "[t]he best results seem to come vhen
management knows what the problem is, and sets down clear boundaries and
objectives in advance."'' Lawyers for a long time have been advised that lawyers
need to advise management about what actually are their problems and question
the work boundaries set for them by non-lawyers. 32 This conflict between the
advice that has been given to companies and their lawyers often poses only a
potential rather than an actual conflict. The conflict does not emerge when
companies strongly trust their lawyers or do not closely monitor legal work.
Project teams, like those for M&A work, attempt to institute what companies long
have been advised. The team allocates work and monitors it closely. A
multidisciplinary decision is made that sets the problem, objectives, and scope of
the legal work to be performed.
This is not to say that lawyers will not sometimes challenge team
decisions. Law is esoteric and sometimes unyielding. Expertise makes moral
investigating its overt and implicit assumptions. For an approach to this task, see Rosen,
LegalDiagnosis,supra note 4.
TRiANTIS, supra note 100, at 137.
128.
Risk management in acquisition projects takes several forms, the most
common being pushing the risk back to the seller or the target through
the use of agreements, negotiating the risk away to third parties, and
allocating risk according to ability to handle. Other approaches to risk
management include purchasing commercial insurance to cover certain
risks and sharing the risk with the seller or other entities according to
potential benefits received.
Id. at 138; see also id. at 267-80.
129.
Id. at 148-49.
Id. at 36.
130
131.

GERALD L. MOORE, THE POLITCS OF MANAGEMENT CONSULTING

238 (1984)

(quoting Walter Guzzardi, Jr., Consultants: The Men Who Came to Dinner,FORTUNE, Feb.
1965, at 238); see also supratext accompanying notes 112-13.
132.
See, e.g., ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF
THE LEGAL PROFEssIoN 121-46, 283-91 (1993); Rosen, Legal Diagnosis, supra note 4, at
208-15.
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demands on its carriers. In redesigned companies, much of consulting work
continues to be "selling and telling," because "the client purchases . ..some
information or an expert service that she is unable to provide herself."' 33 Like
consulting work, much of legal work also will be "selling and telling" to teams.
In other ways, too, companies using lawyers as consultants will not
change the work of corporate lawyers. Consultants describe themselves in terms
compatible with lawyer self-definitions, especially in the large law firms. 134 Like
lawyers, consultants customize expertise for their clients. Consultants apply their
cosmopolitan knowledge to local information. In the language of organizational
theory, lawyers as consultants are still "boundary-spanning professionals.' 35 But
as companies develop porous borders, lawyers as consultants are better described
as "cutpoint[s] ...in a flow of communication," receiving information from the
client and then scanning the legal community "for information and opportunities
relevant to the firm's objectives.' 36 Lawyers on teams still are "buffers,"
transforming expert knowledge to meet the137team's goals and they are "brokers,"
selling appropriations of expert knowledge.
What may be different is that consultants approach problems from the
client's business perspective. 13s Lawyers working on and for teams need to
develop the skills that once were associated with managers' jobs. Like managers,
such lawyers are involved in developing business strategies, enabling their
company "to do something better than the competition."' 39 Like managers, lawyers
playing on teams have to learn to take other team members' "concerns and needs
into consideration," as they compete with them for resources and power. 140 In so
doing, these lawyers, like managers, learn "that their function exists to support
overall business objectives."' 14' They learn to think like a businessperson, not a

133.

EDGAR H. ScHEN, PRocEss CONSULTATION REvISITED: BUILDING THE

HELPING RELATIONSHIP 7 (1999).
134.
One definition of management consultants, formulated by "several US

consulting associations in the mid-1980s" is "[m]anagement consultancy is an independent
and objective advisory service provided by qualified persons to clients in order to help them
identify and analyze management problems or opportunities. Management consultancies
also recommend solutions or suggested actions with respect to these issues, and help, when
requested, in their implementation." CZERNIAWVSKA, supra note 64, at 8 (citation omitted).
135.
1. Stacey Adams, InterorganizationalProcess and Organization Boundary
Activities, 2 REs.

IN ORG.

BEHAv. 321 (1980).

136.
Stacia E. Zabusky & Stephen R. Barley, "You Can't be a Stone ifYou're
Cement": Reevaluating the Emic Identities of Scientists in Organizations,19 REs. IN ORG.
BEHAV. 361, 365 (1997); see also infra text accompanying note 179.
137.
Stephen R. Barley, Technicians in the Workplace: EthnographicEvidence
for Bringing Work into OrganizationStudies, 41 ADMIN. Sci. Q. 404 (1996).
138 Cf Nelson & Nielsen, supra note 9, at 473-77. They report that eighty-three
percent of their inside counsel described acting as counsel or entrepreneur, both of whom
prioritize business objectives. Id. at 468.
139.
CHARAN ETAL., supra note 37, at 21.
140.
Id. at 20. Like managers, lawyers on teams must learn to "value the success
of others." Id. at 24. "Having to work effectively with people who are different is a growth
experience." Id. at 78.
141.
Id. at 66.
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functional specialist1 42 They "must make the shift from 'can we do this?' to 'will
we make money if we do this?"",143 They have to learn that "adding value" is the
basis of concern. When lawyers act like consultants, their applications of legal
skills are done in the managerial frame. For the redesigned company, the opposite
of a consultant is a mere technician, not a carrier of independent professional
judgment.' 44
The problems, which may result when lawyers approach their work with a
business perspective, can be illuminated by considering legal work from the
perspective of risk management. The redesign of companies is linked to the
acceptance both of risk and of capabilities to manage risk. Teams supposedly
facilitate risk taking: "Under conditions of fear-based hierarchical authority, risky
behavior... is discouraged. Teams, by contrast, provide safety from the power
structure to take risks and do new things."'145 Team risk taking is monitored by risk
management reports. 146 Risk managers emerge to147help executives manage the
corporate economy, the executives' redesigned task.
From a risk management
perspective, the company has four types of
14
demand for legal services:
First, some legal work is risk-transformative. 14 9 Most of this work is
captured in the "lawyer as insurer" image. 150 Creating contractual distributions of
responsibility over time and interests-the insurance policy writ large-is a classic
lawyerly responsp to risk. Like insurance agents, lawyers adopt the boy-scout
motto, "be prepared." Whether applying bankruptcy considerations into financial
instruments or opt-out clauses into relational contracts, much of legal service adds
value by transforming the nature of the risks facing management. Risk
transformation products, for example insurance policies and M&A documentation,
differ in their customization, but are viewed by companies as standard products.
From a risk management perspective, the risks to be managed in buying legal risktransformation services are "limited to issues such as assessing transactional
suitability and reviewing documentation."'' Companies minimize suitability risks
by providing lawyers with specific objectives, desired results, and team

142.
Id. at 67.
143.
Id. at 198.
144.
Cf MAIsTER, supra note 32, at 16.
145.
PINCHOT & PiNCHOT, supra note 19, at 198.
146.
See supra text accompanying notes 52, 124-29.
147.
See supra text accompanying notes 49-52.
148.
These distinctions interpret CHRISTOPHER L. CULP, THE RISK MANAGEMENT
PRocEss: BusiNEss STRATEGY AND TAcrIcs 238 (2001). Culp later suggests that "[I]egal
risk has so many different dimensions that it is difficult even to categorize." Id. at 440
(emphasis omitted).
149.
See also TRIANTis, supra note 100, at 138.
150.
Kagan & Rosen, supra note 6, at 415-22.
151.
CuLP,supra note 148, at 238. Culp emphasizes that these risks emerge for
business reasons, for example, "that the counterparty has a different understanding of the
deal than the [corporate] firm" or risks arising from insolvency. Id. at 442, 444.
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monitoring. Using standard forms minimizes documentation risks.15 2 For this type
of demand for legal services, companies seek lawyers who mind their business and
sell them products.
Second, companies demand legal work that informs them of and resolves
risk. Some legal work informs clients of risks in the legal environment.1 53 Other
54
legal work informs clients of legal risks generated by the companies themselves.1
Sometimes lawyers are needed to work with the risk management team to perform
"prudential oversight" of corporate operations.155 Sometimes lawyers respond
when liabilities are realized. Litigators are involved in liability "work-outs."
Companies see these activities as species of information technology (IT). As with
other information technologies, like computing services, companies select firms to
do this type of work who are the most effective/efficient providers. Sometimes
56
consulting firms, not law firms, are chosen by the company to do this work.
Third, some legal work is risk assessment. Lawyers are expected to
provide real-world risk assessments, such as the probability of a regulatory audit.
Liability assessment useful for the risk management process also requires that
lawyers employ basic information technology, such as a decision-analysis tree,
with probabilities assigned to concatenating events.15 7 Lawyers who can58apply the
company's risk assessment procedures are sought for this type of work.1
Fourth, some legal work is risk management. Risk-assessing legal work is
data for risk managers, as legal risks are just one set of risks among many
considered in their decisions. Legal risks not only must be assessed, but also
processed because legal risks often are not detached risks. Consider understanding
a company's insolvency risks without understanding the business risks to which it
is subject, not to mention the need to work with accounting and finance staffs. As
Professor Theodore Eisenberg concludes, the insolvency risk issue shows "the
need for a multidisciplinary approach to risk research in business life.' 159 Because

152.
Products emerge to minimize "documentation risk," for example, a clause
being "either unenforceable or enforceable in a different manner than the firm had in mind."
Id. at 440. "To moderate uncertainty surrounding enforceability, as well as to lower
transaction costs for participants... standardized forms of documentation ... began to
evolve." Id. at 441.
153.
Culp provides an example of understanding the system of multiple,
jurisdictionally limited regulatory authorities. Id. at 449.
154.
Even "the risk management process at a [corporate] firm . . . can
inadvertently create liability-'The board knew the risk was $1 million, retained the risk
anyway, and lost $1 million!' Statements like that may fly in the face of the goals of putting
stakeholder risk tolerances first, but they are nevertheless sometimes made." Id. at 238.
155.
Id. at 450.
156.
See, e.g., Richard L. Abel, TransnationalLaw Practice,44 CASE W. RES. L.
REV.737, 747 (1994).
157.
See, e.g., GLENN KOLLER, RISK ASSESSMENT AND DECISION MAKING I
BUSINESS AND INDUSTRY: A PRACTICAL GUIDE 198-205 (1995).
158.
See infra notes 212-13 and accompanying text.
159.
Theodore Eisenberg, Introduction, in Risk Behavior and Risk Management
in Business Life 257 (Bo Green ed., 2000).
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legal risks must be processed, and this may require more than a basic knowledge
of the law, 160 lawyers can find a place on the risk management team.
The risk management team's task is complicated by the fact that most
corporate legal risks are managed, not eliminated. 161 Managing legal risks often
involves "choosing to retain rather than hedge them."' 162 Some legal work informs
clients of how the law requires risks to be managed, such as when courts have
required risks to be hedged. 163 But managing legal risks requires assessing all the
risks of "policy compliance"/non-compliance and "liability."' 164 Approaching
problems from the client's business perspective, lawyers on risk management
teams approach managing legal risks with non-compliance as a viable option.
It is beyond the scope of this Article to determine if corporations using
lawyers as consultants changes the corporations' or lawyers' decisions about what
is legally proper. Further research is needed to explore this issue. The principal
change described here is an organizational one. The problems set for lawyers differ
in the redesigned company and lawyers use different skills. The effects of these
changes on lawyer organizations are described in the next part. This Article,
however, offers no conclusions about whether, within the type of service for which
they have been hired, lawyers behave differently in the redesigned company.
Further research is needed to address that question.
IV. EFFECTS OF CHANGES IN CLIENT ORGANIZATIONS ON THE
CORPORATE BAR
A. CorporateLegal DepartmentEffects
1. Re-EngineeringLegal Departments
The transformation of legal departments in the 1980s was advanced by
their political movement and assisted by corporate imposed controls over outside
law firms. 165 Today, legal departments hire law firm partners, as well as
associates.' 66 The Inside Counsel Movement, however, is far from
over. For
67
example, in many companies, inside counsel are not trusted advisors.

160.
Cf.TRIANrIs, supra note 100, at 36.
161.
Companies have and do accept different risk levels for different legal risks.
"For example, although the steel industry has had a rocky history with regard to fair
employment practices, its safety record is a model compared with that of the coal industry."
RAELiN, supra note 58, at 249.
162.
CuLP, supranote 148, at 238.
163.
Id. at 447.
164.
Id. at 238.
165.
Rosen, Inside Counsel,supra note 4, at 490-502.
166.
Nelson & Nielsen, supra note 9, at 457 n.1. The Inside Counsel Movement
appears to be making progress. At the company I called "Drafter," based on their primary
activity being that of drafting contracts, Rosen, Responsible Organization, supra note 4 at
192, law firm cast-offs were no longer being hired and members of the legal department had
been on the teams of two outside acquisitions, that outside counsel reportedly only advised
on highly specific issues, such as Mexican employment law. Nonetheless, another
acquisition, one especially critical to the company, used outside counsel on the team,
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On the other hand, some corporate legal departments, including those that
had been transformed in the 1980s and whose inside counsel were management's
trusted advisors, have been re-engineered.168 The redesign of legal departments in
the 1990s came about by imitation, assisted by organizational development
consultants who sold not only the described organizational strategies, but also
organizational processes, including benchmarking. "[B]enchmarking is the
continuous process of measuring products, services, and practices against the
whose "high performing business units" exemplify best
toughest competitors,"
169
practices.

Benchmarking is presented as an audit procedure.1 70 Benchmarking is a
process through which accounting multidisciplinary practices, among other
consulting firms, advise on the re-organization of corporate legal departments at
the same time as they are hiring lawyers. Unsurprisingly, the "best practices" for
legal departments mirror those of multidisciplinary practice firms. 7 Despite this
self-interest, company clients appear to be heeding their advice. The benchnarked
legal department is said to be one that continuously asks itself, "[W]hat needs to be
improved within [our] operation in order to obtain optimum value for [our]
customers?', 72 It is one that offers the services of internal consultants. 73 As this
part describes, benchmarked legal departments redesign their operations to
improve relations with project teams and de-emphasize their lawyers' corporate
service. This results in changed relations between the General Counsel and inside
counsel and the loss of "corporate policy" work.
reportedly because "we [the legal department] were too busy at that point." 1994 Interview,
supra note 10.

167.
The American Corporate Counsel Association (ACCA) continues to advance
the same arguments advanced at its founding in 1986. Larry Smith, A Fresh Eye on
Partnering... The Client/LawFirm Threads Draw Tighter, OF COUNSEL, Oct. 5, 1998, at 2
[hereinafter Smith, Fresh Eye]; see generally THE AMERICAN CORPORATE COUNSEL
ASSOCIATION, at http://www.acca.com.
168.

Frederick J. Krebs, In-House Legal Counsel Adapt in Shifting Times, NAT'L

L.J., Nov. 13, 1995, at C41 ("As clients' operations change, ...law departments must
change as well."). All the corporations that I revisited in 1994 had been partly transformed.
1994 Interview, supra note 10. Even at Drafter, team-management was an issue affecting
the legal department. See Rosen, Responsible Organization, supra note 4, at 192.
169.
JAC FITz-ENz, BENCHMARKING STAFF PERFORMANCE: How STAFF
DEPARTMENTS CAN ENHANCE THEIR VALUE TO THE CUSTOMER 26 (1993).
170.

See id. at 26-54.

171.
Some of this redesign has been beneficial to legal departments. As a result of
benchrnarking, at one company at least, the intellectual property group (including patent
agents) began to report to the General Counsel. Given the technical background (degrees in
science and engineering, for example) of the members of the intellectual property group,
they proved an important entry for the legal department into team involvement. Managers
felt comfortable with them, as they may do with intellectual property lawyers who have
technical backgrounds.
172.
FITz-ENZ, supra note 169, at 13 ("customers," not "the client").
173.

Peter Turner, In-House Lawyers Versus Consultants: May the Best Adviser

Win, 26 INT'L Bus. LAW. 247 (1998) "[T]oday's corporate lawyers are indeed in direct
competition with consultants. Consequently, I believe that we need to rapidly learn how to
play the consultant's game according to their rules." Id. at 248.
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Company redesign poses a significant threat to legal departments. "When
a process is re-engineered . .. [fjunctional departments lose their reason for
being." 174 In 1995 interviews, Nelson & Nielson found that "[m]any respondents
indicated that there is a danger that the Legal Department may come to be viewed
as expendable." 175 If legal departments are only hiring-halls
76 for an internal lawyer
labor market, lawyers can be moved to other hiring-halls.1
Legal departments responded by using the team concept in three distinct
ways.
First, they developed "intrapreneurial"' 177 teams within the legal
department, demonstrating how the department could be a profit center. Second,
they divided into competing teams. Third, they promoted company use of lawyers
on project teams, thereby creating and maintaining work for inside counsel.
In addition to being a hiring-hall for the company, the legal department
can add value to the company by forming its own project teams. "Intraprises"
178
(entrepreneurial teams) can be built within corporate legal departments.
Recognizing that "law can itself be a source of profits, an instrument to be used
aggressively in the marketplace," the legal department can form project teams, for
example, "to use the law to generate new sources of revenue for the
corporation."' 179 Legal departments also can generate revenues for their companies
by selling its lawyers' work in external markets. 80 Sometimes they find a market,
and sometimes not. Legal departments also can form teams, task forces, and
groups to examine issues that "cut across many people's plates," such as

174.
Knights &Willmott, supra note 20, at 8 (source omitted). In the early 1990s,
various companies totally outsourced their legal work, eliminating their law departments.
Michael France, Firing the Legal Department, 15 CAL. LAw. 35 (1994); Michael France,
CorporationsQuestion Needfor In-House Counsel, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 17, 1994, at C3. Others

redesigned their legal departments so that outsourcing was "the base against which to
measure internal staffing arrangements." David B. Garten, A Receptive Attitude Makes
ChangePossible,NAT'L L.J., Oct. 17, 1994, at C21.
175.
Nelson & Nielsen, supra note 9, at 477.
176.
Larry Smith, The Shared Services Specter ... Mobil's Strategy to "Break
Down Fiefdoms" Generates Mixed Reactions, OF COUNSEL, Jan. 5, 1998, at 1 (company

adopting "shared services" approach in which inside counsel "report to the same nonlawyer
manager as staff from human resources, information technology, purchasing, public affairs,
etc.") [hereinafter Smith, SharedServices].
This popular neologism refers to teams within a company who engage in
177.
externally-oriented entrepreneurship.
178.
PINCHOT & PINCHOT, supranote 19, at 189.
Nelson & Nielsen, supra note 9, at 466, 487 (providing examples of teams
179.
generating revenues "by taking advantage of loopholes in regulations to enter new fields of
business by creating new forms of intellectual property, by creating new business entities."
Id. at 487.
180.
PrNCHOT & PINCHOT, supra note 19, at 190. Sometimes legal departments
entering the market of outside legal services can be troubling. Consider, for example,
members of an insurance company's corporate legal department who form a private law
firm engaging in insurance defense, in part to prevent jurors from characterizing them as
company mouthpieces. Julie Kay, Counterfeit Law Firms?,FLA. LAw., Oct. 2001, at 6.
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"ethics."181 "Lawyers don't run these" teams, inside counsel emphasize, but they
show that the legal department can be more than a hiring-hall
182 and bring inside
counsel into contact with "senior operations and staff people."
Second, legal departments responded by dividing themselves into
competing hiring-halls. Emphasizing that increasing choice and competitiveness
are the ideological underpinnings of team and outsourcing redesigns, some legal
departments formed competing teams of inside counsel, which bid against each
other for work from project teams. 84
Third, legal departments promoted their lawyers' inclusion on
multidisciplinary teams. 8 5 Legal departments can market the legal function by
advertising "the pervasiveness of legal issues in corporate operations" and by
making their "advice more palatable to businesspeople," in part by advertising that
186
they are "part of the company, rather than... obstacles to getting things done."'
Legal departments can accept that, in the redesigned company, legal departments
largely function as hiring-halls for teams and promote inside counsel having a
place, wherever possible, on teams.
Teams' abilities to outsource their legal work made this marketing role
essential to legal departments. Companies are advised that using outsourcing on a
project "means that only its outcome matters, and the [legal] knowledge behind it
is nonessential" to the company. 187 To persuade project teams to choose them over
outside lawyers, inside counsel must demonstrate either that they have the abilities
to provide quality, efficient output or that process matters. To do the second, they
have to sell themselves as consultants. Best practices for the redesigned company
favors inside over outside consultants when "[e]ffectively performing the role of
knowledge customization requires in-depth knowledge of the client, including
what information and knowledge adds the greatest value, the client's decision-

181.
1994 Interview, supra note 10. One legal department I visited had made its
generation of company-wide teams the department's goal for that year. Although his
company was trying to cut down on as many meetings as possible, the General Counsel
reported success in organizing retreats, task forces and then teams on company-wide issues,
such as the creation of the office of the ombudsman. He emphasized that all these efforts
had to be sold as the minimal organizational structures necessary to deal with the issue. Id.
182.
Id. (interviewing a different respondent).
183.
PINCHOT & PINCHOT, supranote 19, at 121; see also id. at 197 ("To create an
effective free intraprise system, we must make sure internal customers have free choice
among alternatives and that an honest system empowers intrapreneurs to keep and spend,
without bureaucratic interference, what they earn for the purposes of the intraprise.").
184.
Id. at 186-87. The project team would choose which bid, if any, to accept.
Id. at 187.
185.
Id. at 194-211; cf Martin A. Levine & Herbert I. Lerner, Outsourcing:
Opportunitiesand Challengesfor the Corporate Tax Executive, TAX ExEcurivE, Sept. 1,

1993, at 375, 378 (stating that tax departments are seeking positions on corporate teams).
186.
Nelson & Nielsen, supra note 9, at 459, 477.
187.
DAWSON, supra note 54, at 10 (nonessential to the company's "core
competencies").
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making processes and
188 capabilities, and the cognitive preferences of key individuals
in the client group."'
The team-based redesign of legal departments is sometimes evident in the
very architecture of their offices. I have seen headquarter legal department offices
where the lawyers have been moved out of the offices they obtained during the
Inside Counsel Movement (arguing for their need to protect confidences) to nonfloor-to-ceiling modules. Small, enclosed conference
8 9 rooms are provided and used
when there is a need to protect team confidences.'
Lawyers may find places on teams, but team management nonetheless
threatens the legal department with becoming a mere hiring-hall because "the selfmanaging team takes on personnel selection, discipline, and compensation."' 90 The
slogan is that lawyers are functioning not in "Expert-Dependent" but
"Communication-Intensive" organizations. 191 The reality is that inside counsel's
use and rewards are not determined only by the legal department. 192 As a
consequence, although the members of the legal department "may still be in a
reporting relationship to headquarters, the real power
influencing their destiny
93
stems from the choices made by" the project team.'
Because the "quality of the interaction process" guides teams' "selecting
between alternative" providers, 94 project teams influence authority relations
within the legal department. In some redesigned companies, "[i]ncreasingly some
lawyers found themselves with unbillable time. Their plight was made more
annoying by the fact that others were turning work away." 195 The result was to
increase pay disparity within legal departments. 196 In many cases, seasoned inside
specialist lawyers depended on a younger generalist inside counsel, who was a
team member, to assign work projects. 97 Judged by billings, in legal departments

188.
Id. at 154.
189.
In one company, next to the conference rooms was a small room with
recording equipment and telephones, presumably because paranoia is sometimes justified.
190.
Mark Barenberg, Democracy and Domination in the Law of Workplace
Cooperation: From Bureaucratic to Flexible Production, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 753, 891
(1994) ("as well as budgeting, purchasing, and customer-relations tasks").
191.
Frank Blackler, Knowledge, Knowledge Work and Organizations: An
Overview andInterpretation,16 ORGANIZATION STUD. 1021 (1995).
192.
RAELIN, supra note 58, at 174-78. Company managers always played a role
in determining inside counsel's fate. In the legal departments of the 1980s, lawyer
compensation was dependent on "legal skills, interpersonal and team skills." Donald S.
Brooks, Training andDevelopment in a CorporateLaw Department,LEGAL EcoN., Nov.Dec. 1985, at 31, 36. Managers evaluated inside counsel on these skills, Dan A. Bruce,
PerformanceAppraisalin a CorporateLaw Department,LEGAL ECON., Mar.-Apr. 1985, at
51, but then the legal department had final say in determining compensation. With teams,
corporate managers directly exercise control.
193.
PINCHOT & PINCHOT, supra note 19, at 122.
194.
'lark & Salaman, supra note 67, at 174.
195.
PINCHOT & PINCHOT, supra note 19, at 187.
196.
Mark Curiden, It's Lonely at the Bottom... Survey Shows Slow Pay Growth
Among In-Housefor Non-Managers,OF COUNSEL, Jan. 2001, at 24.
197.
PINCHOT & PINCHOT, supra note 19, at 189-90.
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"older lawyers without clients found themselves at the bottom ... while younger
98
lawyers with excess business found themselves in positions of power."'
In redesigned legal departments, inside counsel also may be subject to
work intensifications and speed-ups. Although legal departments once were
advanced as a place for women with family responsibilities to work, 199 at least one
survey of female inside counsel reports that only nine percent believe that flexible
schedules will not hurt their chances of advancement and sixty-six percent report
having difficulty balancing work and personal life.200 Other lawyers lured inside
return to their old firms, finding no increase in work hours and higher wages
outside. 201 Nelson
& Nielson conclude that inside counsel now "attempt to be lean
20 2
and mean."
Inside counsel always had two reporting relationships, one to the General
Counsel and another to the supervisors of the employees with whom they work.
Inside counsel's inter-organizational power with supervisors, in part, derived from
the strength of their superior's (the General Counsel's) access to the executive
suites. Inside counsel's claims to increased respect and dignity within the legal
profession depended on the General Counsel attaining power within the company
and using this power when the independence of inside counsel was somehow
20 3
threatened; for example, when they might "have to go along to get along."
In the redesigned company, a General Counsel may have the power in the
organization envisioned by the Inside Counsel Movement, but she "may relinquish
substantial oversight over the day-to-day operations of in-house counsel and spend
more time directly advising and participating in strategy meetings with the CEO
and Board of Directors. ' '204 With self-managing teams and the flattening of the
chain of command, the General Counsel has no place to support inside counsel at
198.
Id. at 189. If they are like other professionals, older lawyers are more likely
to accept the client's definition of the problem and are less likely to engage in conflict on
the basis of their professionalism. See RAELiN, supra note 58, at 18-19. This makes
specialist lawyers doubly unlikely to contest the team's requirements, as relayed to them by
the more junior attorneys on the teams who employ them. In some legal departments, inside
counsel resisted these changes, asserting the requirements of their professional
independence. Pinchot & Pinchot describe a lawyer saying that the positive aspects of
teams:

must not blind us to a real danger, the danger that some of us, driven by
the urge to increase our billings, will bend over too far to help clients
pursue ideas that are inherently full of legal risk. In this new [manager's]
free choice [of lawyer] system[,] the corporation is increasingly at risk.
PINCHOT & PINCHOT, supranote 19, at 188.
199.
See Grace M. Giesel, The Business ClientIs A Woman: The Effect of Women
As In-House Counsel On Women in Law Firms and the Legal Profession, 72 NEB. L. REv.
760 (1993).
200.
Is Life Really Better In-House?, AM. LAw., Mar. 2001, at 19; but see supra
text accompanying note 3 (discussing the unreliability of lawyer surveys).
201.
Curriden, supra note 196, at 24. It also shows that the pay gap between
inside and outside lawyers is increasing. Id.
202.
Nelson & Nielsen, supra note 9, at 487.
203.
Rosen, Inside Counsel Movement, supranote 4, at 552-53.
204.
Smith, Shared Services, supra note 176, at 1.
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the team level or at the level immediately above the team. °5 If the General
Counsel wishes to exercise her power, she must exercise it at the executive level,
in the presence of the VP's of the other functional specialists on the team.
Furthermore, the changing role of the General Counsel is accompanied by
redesign's attack on intra-organizational bureaucracy. Consequently, even though
led by non-monitoring General Counsels, "few if any law departments have formal
ethics committees or ' lawyers
designated as ethics consiglieres to advise either the
20 6
legal staff or the GC.
Redesigning companies also changes the types of work that inside
counsel perform. In so doing, it changes inside counsel's abilities to resist
irresponsible company actions.
Part of the work of legal departments has been to help draft and enforce
uniform rules and standards throughout the company. In the company decisionprocess, inside counsel have argued for results based on their organizational
memory, the corporate culture, the "internal law of the organization," and
company policies. 2 7 Lawyers can "get people to understand and become
comfortable with what the company expects and they don't expect.

20 8

In the

redesigned company, however, "Guaranteed Rights" replace uniform rules and
standards are constantly changed, due to20the
company's emphasis on innovation
9
and imitating customers and competitors.
The shift from company-wide rules and policies to "Guaranteed Rights"
shifts work from legal departments in three ways. First, there are the direct effects
of the lost work. Second, as the "Guaranteed Rights" of the redesigned company,
by and large, are employment rights, disputes increasingly involve HR (Human
Resources) departments. The legal department, wanting to maintain good relations

205.
Nelson & Nielsen, supra note 9, at 473 ("The clear impression for the
interviews, however, is that not all questions go up the legal chain of command."). The lack
of importance of the General Counsel's professional support in the redesigned company is
demonstrated by Nelson & Nielsen's including lawyers who do not report to the General
Counsel as inside counsel (for example., lawyers who report to the CFO or VP of Human
Resources). Id. at 471, 475. Such lawyers were not traditionally thought to be inside
counsel. Counsel, In-house, 4 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL AND
BEHAVIORAL SCIENCEs 2851 (Neil J. Smelser and Paul B. Baltes eds., 2001). Enron's
General Counsel, James Derrick, is praised by his legal staff for his "honesty, intelligence
and affability," but is criticized for being "a hands-off manager" who "doesn't even know
the names of his lawyers." What did he do? Derrick was "involved" in Enron board
decisions. Hechler, supra note 29, at Al, Al1. Pinchot & Pinchot recommend the creation
of"a tiny corporate legal inspection team with the power to discipline lawyers who failed to
look after the safety of the corporation and its officers." PINCHOT & PINCHOT, supra note 19,
at 189.
206.
Smith, Fresh Eye, supra note 167, at 5; but see PINCHOT & PINCHOT, supra
note 19, at 189.
207.
Rosen, Responsible Organization, supra note 4, at 239-63.
208.
1994 Interview, supra note 10.
209.
PINCHOT & PINCHOT, supra note 19, at 37; see also John R. Sutton & Frank
Dobbin, The Two Faces of Governance: Responses to Legal Uncertainty in U.S. Firms,
1955 to 1985, 61 AM. Soc. REV. 794 (1996).
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with managers, often tries to avoid human resources disputes. 210 In large
companies, HR legal disputes normally are undertaken either by lawyers working
for the VP of HR or by outside counsel. Third, at the same time as lost work drives
inside counsel to focus on their acceptance by teams, inside counsel's range of
arguments is reduced because inside counsel lose the ability to invoke company
rules and standards to resist team pressures. Furthermore, in their self-designed,
flexible roles, it is not appropriate for team members to say, "This is my
department's
position on this issue" or "in my function, we were taught to do it
211
this way."
Before redesign, inside counsel provided to individual managers the
company's perspective on what risk levels are acceptable and how to balance
risks. 2 In the redesigned company, inside counsel join with other team members
to make a team decision on acceptable risks. The inside counsel-team member's
only specifically legal task is to measure legal risks. For executives to choose
which projects to pursue, they need consistent risk assessments. Risk assessment
procedures are standardized in corporate redesign. New recruits into the corporate
legal department are not introduced to what levels of legal risks the company finds
acceptable, but to a consistent "terminology" 213
to be used in measuring and
presenting legal risks across all corporate projects.
Preventive law work2 14 continues to have a place in re-engineered
companies. As in bureaucratic organizations, inside counsel add value by
educating employees to do legal tasks by themselves. z5 But in keeping with the
redesigned company's organizational philosophy, when nonlawyer employees do
legal work by themselves, there is no monitoring except in particularly sensitive
areas. As a General Counsel told me, "You have to treat them like adults. 216
When pushed, inside counsel admit there are accountability problems
with using self-managing teams. But, besides being aware of the problems, not
much is being done to address them. For the most part, legal departments are
trying to secure their own place in the redesigned company, for example, by
developing proper management tools. Such tools include biannual reports on the
legal department's performance, prepared according to best practices business
models. Some legal departments are responding to the problems of teams
210.

211.

See Rosen, supra note 75.
Mintzberg, supra note 38, at 137-43. See generally GIDEON KUNDA,

ENGINEERING CULTURE: CONTROL AND COMMITMENT IN A HIGH-TECH CORPORATION

(1992).

212.
Rosen, Responsible Organization, supra note 4, at 164-217.
213.
KOLLER, supra note 157, at 199. Company history in this process is reduced
to data-retention. "A well-constructed risk model should provide for... downloading model
input and output data to a database. Such archived information can be invaluable in solving
future problems." Id. at 200.
214.
Rosen, Inside CounselMovement, supra note 4, at 519-25.
215.
Preventive law work serves inside counsel as well, by enabling them to
concentrate on being part of higher-level teams, "More you educate people, the less time
you spend at lower levels," and the more time you spend with "managerial level issues."
1994 Interview, supra note 10.
216.
Cf Nelson & Nielsen, supra note 9, at 473 ("Inside counsel often noted the
legal sophistication of higher levels of management").
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indirectly, by trying to build greater department cohesiveness. Increased use of
meetings, video-conferencing, retreats, and the like can respond to the breakdown
of the department by team assignments. Although their purpose is to create
cohesion among inside counsel, in the redesigned company they are justified as
being required to enable inside counsel "to be proactive; to add2 value;
to help the
17
machine to do better; [and] shutdowns to do maintenance work."
In 1994, I learned inside counsel at corporate headquarters knew their
heads were on a chopping block. As "headquarters staff," they were particularly
subject to the next wave of downsizings. They knew their careers depended not on
their expertise, but on relationships that they feared losing. The inside counsel
whom I re-interviewed were older and much more sober than they were in the
early 1980s.
2. PurchasingAgents but not Gatekeepers
In the 1980s, inside counsel became "purchasing agents" for outside legal
services. To minimize legal fees, among other reasons, only the legal department
could authorize the employment of outside lawyers. 218 Outsourcing changed this.
Not only were corporate users of legal services allowed to select whom in the legal
department they wanted to engage for their project, but they also were allowed to
choose lawyers who worked for outside firms. The proponents of outsourcing
argue "users deep in the organization experience [in the legal department] what
looks to them like a distant monopoly. If they do not like the service, there is
nothing they can do about it except complain-which is unlikely to improve the
service in the long run. 219 In response, corporate redesign allowed end users to
select the lawyers with whom they wanted to work. "The inside functions could
bid, but the team was free to accept the offer with the best mix of timing, cost, and
quality." 220 In some redesigned companies, corporate legal departments continue to
have roles in the purchase of outsourced legal services, but nonetheless they have
lost the right to veto the purchase. They still are purchasing agents, but no longer
are they gatekeepers.22'
Outsourcing thus attacked legal department power. Pinchot & Pinchot
report that they heard from many clients in many industries that:

217.
1994 Interview, supra note 10.
218.
Rosen, Inside CounselMovement, supra note 4 at 503-25.
219.
PINCHOT & PNCHOT, supra note 19, at 121.
220.
Id. at 169. Raelin explains functional outsourcing as the return of managers'
"right" to go outside. RAELiN, supra note 58, at 230; see also TtIANTIs, supra note 100, at
40 (business development group's role in selection of outside experts).
221.
For an instance in which the manager selects a lawyer, see Nelson & Nielsen,
supra note 9, at 481. Compare the absence of a response by the legal profession or ACCA
(inside counsel's organization) to the loss of the gatekeeping role with that of the Tax
Executives Institute (TEI). The TEI "has secured commitments from all of the Big 6
accounting firms that they will not bypass the tax department in seeking outsourcing
engagements, and [the TEl] has followed up with the firms where it appears the
commitment has not been honored." Outsourcing: The Debate Continues, 47 TAX
ExEcuTivE, Mar.-Apr. 1995, at 95, 96.
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It is much harder for us to do business with another division of our
own company than to deal with an outsider. Vendors have to do
what we want or we find someone else. With our divisions, if we
ask for something that they don't want to provide, we end up in a
political battle that escalates to the highest levels and threatens all
our careers. It is easier to put up with mediocrity, or go to the
trouble of setting up relations with an outsider. 2
In the redesigned company, not only are the arguments available to inside
counsel restricted, as discussed in the previous part, but also their intra-corporate
power is reduced. 2z Companies are advised that outsourcing makes functional
departments "want to provide" the requested services and avoid "battles."2 24
With outsourcing, even the purchasing agent role of the legal department
was attacked. Some legal departments that sought to remain purchasing agents
imposed overhead costs on teams when legal services were outsourced as "an
inspection fee to make sure the outsiders did not succumb to excess client
pleasing." 225 Managers were quick to portray the overhead instead "as a tariff to
encourage continued use of inside resources whenever the decision was a close
one."' , 2 6 In response, some legal departments reduced their purchasing involvement
to just reviewing outside consultants' contracts.227 In the redesigned company,
inside counsel may lose their role as purchasing agents unless they exercise that
role as a team member. On many teams, inside counsel's arguments for a

222.
PINCHOT & PINCHOT, supra note 19, at 171. See supra note 166 for an inside
counsel defense mechanism to teams going outside, "[W]e were too busy" to do the
outsourced work. Partnering with outside law firms who will include inside counsel on the
team is a more effective response.
223.
To reduce legal department power, in my judgment, the threat of outsourcing
would have been sufficient. The extent of current legal outsourcing suggests that cutting
legal departments down to size cannot be its only justification. Furthermore, the loss of the
gate-keeping role does not appear to be economically justified. The economic justifications
for outsourcing are the efficiencies of using cosmopolitan providers, especially when the
company does not need to capture the cosmopolitan knowledge for its own development.
This is the argument of Harvard Business School Professor Quinn, see JAMEs BRIAN QUINN,
INTELLIGENT ENTERPRISE (1992). See summary in PINCHOT & PINCHOT, supra note 19, at
168-69. This justification for outsourcing, however, does not support legal departments
losing their gate-keeping role, for in the 1980s inside counsel demonstrated that they were
the cheapest finders of cosmopolitan legal knowledge. Antonia H. Chayes & Abram
Chayes, Corporate Counsel and the Elite Law Firm, 37 STAN. L. REv. 277 (1985). That
redesigned companies expend resources on inside counsel partnering with outside counsel,
see infra Part IV(B), also suggests strong limitations on the efficiencies gained by not
continuing with the legal department as the gate-keeping purchasing agent
224.
See PINCHOT & PINCHOT, supra note 19, at 171.
225.
Id. at 190.
226.
Id.
227.
Daryl Van Duch, Auditors' Top Lawyer Does it All at KMPG, NAT'L L.J.,
Apr. 12, 1999, at BI (KPMG's legal department lawyers only "negotiate and review all
consulting contracts"). Legal departments also may retain a role in the retention decision by
designating an inside counsel to buffer initial relations between businesspeople and outside
counsel. See, e.g., General Electric Company Outside Counsel Policy, OF COUNSEL, May
15, 2000, at 5.
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particular outsourced law finn are respected and, in that sense, inside counsel are
still purchasing agents. But teams can override these arguments, thus, inside
counsel are no longer gatekeepers.
B. RelationsBetween Inside and Outside Counsel: Partnering
The relations between inside and outside counsel in the redesigned
company may be summarized in one word: "partnering."
Outside counsel are quick to embrace outsourcing and porous borders
because these organizational strategies can lead to more relational work, rather
than one-shot transactions. Outside law firms pursue rotations and internships for
their lawyers at their clients, at the same time as they continue to participate in
bidding wars, called "beauty contests." "It is fairly common for law firms to
temporarily post their lawyers at key clients. '228 This allows for a "rich two-way
knowledge transfer and relationship development [as the proponents of
outsourcing argue] ... and [the client] becomes far more inclined to choose that
law firm over others it knows less well."2 29
At the same time, outside counsel embrace inside counsel as partners as
the outsourcing movement advises. 30 For law firms, when outside counsel have a
"partner" inside counsel on teams, the law firn is more likely to maintain
sustained relationships with the company.231 Outside counsel also may support
inside counsel winning a place on teams because it provides outside counsel
advantages over lawyers who work in consulting firms. Teams are
multidisciplinary, so the lawyers meet as equals with, for example, engineers and
accountants. 232 Each of these equals has an interest in outsourcing to a different
type of consulting firm, many of whom have legal capabilities; there are
engineering and accounting firms with legal staffs. Having inside counsel as a
partner on the team may help law firms be selected when outsourced legal
expertise is sought.233
228.
DAWSON, supra note 54, at 52. Corporate-imposed controls on billing,
including no billing for the time of associates in their first years, also stimulates this trend.
Cf. Ann Davis, Learning Before: EarningNo Bill to Clientsfor Training,NAT'L L.J., Sept.
30, 1996, at A4. Partnering's advantage for law firms may also be obtained by their hiring
former inside counsel. Lisa Brennan, Don't Bank On It: Thinking of Leaving Law for the
Investment World? Learnfrom those who Switched and Returned, NAT'L L.J., July 6, 1998,
atAl.
229.
DAWsoN, supra note 54, at 162.
230.
See supra text accompanying notes 68-71.
231.
See Jill Schachner Chanen, Constructing Team Spirit, 83 A.B.A.J., Aug.
1997, at 58; Smith, Fresh Look, supra note 167; Larry Smith, Lawyers as Managers and
Managers as Lawyers... Steptoe's Shrewd New Client Consulting Strategy, OF COUNSEL,
Mar. 20, 1998, at 2.
232.
For a discussion of lawyer difficulties in working as equals, see Chanen,
supra note 231, at 59.
233.
Larry Smith, ACCA Report Defines a Market... Increased Vigilance in a
Downsized Environment, OF COUNSEL, Dec. 1-15, 1997, at 2. Tax departments and
outsourced consultants forming an "alliance." Cf. Stephen A. Moore, Outsourcing the Tax
Function:A Survey, TAX EXEctTVE, May-June 1994, at 175, 177.
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For inside counsel, partnering places them on teams when legal work is
outsourced. Both inside and outside counsel will argue that inside counsel is
needed to buffer outside counsel's work so that it best serves the corporation's
interests.234 Inside counsel also can argue that, through their presence on teams,
they retain, in the company, knowledge transferred from outside lawyers, hence
maximizing value to the company from outsourced work.23
For companies, partnering supposedly allows them "to impose lasting
discipline"
and "more sophisticated supervision" on both inside and outside
236
counsel.
C. Outside Law Firm Effects
In the 1990s, "[m]any law firms have learned from the business world
that it's smart to market themselves, strategically plan growth and use management
consultants.",237 Law firm management consultants advised law firms to re-orient
themselves to be client-focused, thereby selling added value. 238 And many law
firms have tried to follow that advice. 239
A typical account of such a re-orientation is provided by Stephan
Haeckel's description of his work with a "mid-sized Midwestem legal firm led by
an executive comnmittee of six senior partners" he names the LaBarr Partnership.240
At a law firm retreat, Haeckel asked the lawyers to describe the mission of the law
firm. Each of their self-generated mission statements described the law firm as
existing to serve its lawyers by producing high quality legal services.24' Working
with the management consultant, the partners came to see that their mission
instead was to provide added value to their clients.242 Consider these actual law

234.
Peter D. Zeughauser & Sara Holtz, PartneringNirvana, AM. LAW., Nov.
1997, at 36.
235.
This aspect of partnering may not be in accord with outside counsel's longterm interests. At two of the corporations I had studied, inside counsel were doing M&A
work. At one, sufficient knowledge supposedly was transferred so that M&A deals were
made with inside counsel using lawyers in investment banks and accounting firms, but not
in law firms.
236.
John E. Morris, A Healthy Disbelief,AM. LAw., Aug. 1997, at 5; see also
Clive Allen, Partnering:Developing Effective Working Relationships Between Inside and
Outside Counsel, 24 INT'L Bus. LAW. 516, 517 (1996) ("A firm must show commitment to
a client and its business"); Daryl Van Duch, supra note 227 ("There are firms you have to
watch like a hawk, and then there are firms that you can relax with. They're like part of the
family.").
237.
Jonathan Foreman, PoorPeople Skills Can Collapse Firms,NAT'L L.J., Nov.
29, 1996, atAl.
238.
E.g., MAIsTER, supra note 32.
239.
See, e.g., Patrick J. McKenna, The Next Frontier... How To Make Strategic
Innovation Happen, OF COUNSEL, Feb. 2002, at 5; Steven Alan Bennett, Law Firms Mount
Challenges to House Counsel, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 13, 1995, at C42.
240.
STEPHAN H. HAECKEL, ADAPTIVE ENTERPRISE: CREATING AND LEADING
SENSE-AND-REsPOND ORGANIZATIONS 116-17 (1999).

241.
242.

Id. at 117-19.
Id. at 121. Peter Drucker puts it as follows:
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firm slogans: "'Clients First,' 'Committed to You and Your Achievements,' 'Legal
Solutions Tailor Made,' 'Practical Lawyers Providing Practical Solutions,' and
[my favorite,
depicting the law firm as the client's best friend] 'Global Guard
243
Dogs.'

1. The Age of the Minders
To be focused on clients, law firms think of themselves as client "delivery
systems," 244 whose key is client management. Designs for best practices in law
firms are similar to those for their corporate clients, and both derive from
templates modeled on consulting firms. 245 Take a trivial example, a change without
much substance: Associates once were told they worked for a partner, now
associates in many firms are told they work on a client team. Now consider a more
significant change.
To be focused on clients, law firms are advised to redesign intra-firm
relations along the model of accounting consulting firms. 246 They should create
"client relationship partner[s]," who learn about clients' potential needs for legal
services and form teams to service them.247
They should organize themselves
248
around industries rather than practice areas.

From a marketing point of view... all the questions were: How do we
sell the law firm? Not one question: Who buys.... You say, "we know
our product, we know our competence. Let's go and find customers for
them." No. That is the way the professional does it, but that's why the
professional needs a marketing man or a marketing woman who can say,
"These are our customers. This is what they need. This is how they buy.
This is how they Work. And this is the direction they're going."
Larry Smith, Outward Bound... What PeterDruckerHas to Say to Lawyers and Law Firm
Managers,OF COUNSEL, Mar. 2, 1998, at 2, 3, 13; see also Larry Smith, Three Soothsayers
Assess Profession-Wide Trendsfor 1996, OF COUNSEL, Jan. 1, 1996, at 1 [hereinafter Smith,
Three Soothsayers].
243.
Ashby Jones and Michael Ravnitzky, Counselor at Law, AM. LAW, Jan.

2001, at 47.
244.

John P. Heinz et al., The Changing Characterof Lawyers' Work: Chicagoin

1975 and 1995, 32 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 751, 770 (1998); see also Jonathan J. Asperger, How
Agile is Your Legal Department? As CorporationsChange Operations,In-House Lawyers
Better Be Ready to Adapt, CORP. LEGAL TIMEs, Aug. 1995, at I.
245.
See, e.g., CZERNIAWSKA, supra note 64, at 23-24.
246.
Compare DAWSON, supra note 54, at 154, with Gerald Hanlon, A Shifting
Professionalism:An Examination ofAccountancy, in THE END OF PROFESSIONS? 123, 13037 (Jane Broadbent et al. eds., 1996).
247.
Peter D. Zeughauser, Optimal Organization, AM. LAW., Mar. 2001, at 63
(asserting that "[t]he wisdom of assigning client relationship partners has become selfevident to most forward looking law firms"). From the company's perspective, a client
relations partner is a "responsible partner" or an "account supervisor." James M. Melville,
"ResponsiblePartner" Can Help Ease Conflicts, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 17, 1994, at C16.
248.
See Cindy Collins, ClientService Strategies ... A Fev Firm Holdouts Resist
Interdepartmental Specialty Groups, OF COUNSEL, Jan. 1, 1996, at 6; Edwin H.
Greenebaum, Development of Law Firm Training Programs: Coping with a Turbulent
Environment, 3 INT'L J. LEGAL PROF. 315, 321 (1996) (describing United Kingdom firms);
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Previously, finders, attorneys who brought in new clients, were
considered more valuable to the firm than minders, those who
maintained relationships with current clients, or grinders, those who
did the research, drafted the contracts, and so forth. A client-centric
249
approach implicitly placed a premium on minding talents.
Minders are valuable to the firm because, even if they do not generate
work from client chief executives, they generate new work through their contacts
with client teams.2 0 Law firms are advised that "the greatest untapped source of

work is the firm's existing client base." 251 Having enough clients, but not enough

252
In redesigned
work is a common complaint of corporate practitioners.
253
companies, work starts from the team level and is managed at the team level.
Most communication is peer-to-peer. Finders talk to senior executives and minders
talk to project managers and teams, sometimes through juniors when status
appropriate.2 4 In redesigned companies, work flows bottom-up, rather than topdown. As a result, law firm minders, rather than finders, are most likely to learn of
z5
new work that might be outsourced to their firm. When work emerges from
teams, many "outside counsel" may be better termed "outsourced counsel" to
emphasize that outside counsel's perspective is to become as much a part of the
team as the team allows. Instead, they are termed "client relations partners."

In order to be focused on clients, law firms are advised, they must change
how work is valued. The most valued work should be tracking changes over time
in client circumstances and the law.2 6 To value this work, law firms should create

Smith, Three Soothsayers, supra note 242, at 11; Lori Tripoli, A Marketing Ploy That's
Worked . . . Law Firm Commitments to Industry Niche Practices Reap Benefits, OF
COUNSEL, Jan. 18, 1999, at 1 ("industry niches facilitate cross selling"); Zeughauser, supra
note 247 (discussing Freshfields and other firms adopting this form of organization).
HACKEL, supra note 240, at 121 (emphasis omitted). On the anxieties of
249.
requiring all partners to be finders, see D.M. Osborne, Awakening: What They Never Told
You About Partnership,AM. LAw., Mar. 1998, at 71. Rewarding the development of work
from existing clients may reduce aspects of these anxieties.
How Inside Counsel Are Shaping Firms, NAT'L L.J., June 16, 1997, at Al,
250.
A16 (stating that business does not only come from "the golf course") (citing comments of
Jane A. Boyle, Aetna, Inc. from a panelists' discussion).
David Temporal, Beyond Client Care, AM. LAW., July 2001, at 65 (asserting
251.
that "midsize and large firms derive a significant proportion of their income and profit from
a small number of clients. ...At many finns, it is typical to see the top 50 clients generate
between 45 and 60 percent of the firm's income."); see also MAISTER, supra note 32, at 168.
As a percentage of all lawyer time, general corporate work decreased from
252.
eleven to six percent between 1975 and 1995. Heinz et al., supra note 244, at 766-67.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that this complaint is a "common" one.
See, e.g., TRIANTIS, supra note 100, at 181-83.
253.
DAwSON, supra note 54, at 156-58; see also Rosen, Responsible
254.
Organization, supranote 4, at 36-41 (using the OPM scandal to illustrate the hazards of this
relationship model).
MAIsTER, supra note 32, at 178-80.
255.
HAECKEL, supra note 240, at 121; see also Am. Bar Ass'n, The New
256.
Frontiers of Business and Legal Advice, Transformations in Legal Careers and Practice
Settings, the ABF Fellows Seminar, RESEARCHING L.: AN ABF UPDATE, Summer 2001, at 1.
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257
compensation schemes, which encourage increased billings from current clients.

In this compensation scheme, client relationship partners' tasks importantly
include solicitation, ethically permissible soliciting of one's current clients. The
client relationship partners' "role is often nominally a 'sales' function, which is

largely consumed by customizing and packaging specialist knowledge to make it
most useful to clients.

' 58

Finders are castigated as inhibitors of clients developing into "firm
clients" because finders see their "clients as the source of the partner's power and
influence within the firm," tend to take a "proprietary view of their clients," and
hesitate to turn their clients over to other partnersY29 "Rewards for rainmakers too
often interfere with the work of client relationship partners. The magic is balancing
. .. compensation between those responsible for landing the client and those
responsible for nurturing the relationship with the client."2 60 Minders and finders
partners, who always competed for "firm profits," now also compete for "client
profits."26'
The growing role that minders play in law firms also is influenced by two
other changes in corporate law firms. First, there is the demographic shift: Large
finn partners are retiring in their fifties.262 Many of these partners were the finders
of companies who may have become "firm clients." With the finder's retirement,
the partner who maintains relationship with the firm client becomes essential to
maintaining the client as a stable firm client. Briefly stated, the retirements of
finders mature minders. Second, there is the corporate litigation boom; in Chicago,
the most pronounced growth (between 1975 and 1995) in law firm work was the
vfns
263
increasing proportion of time spent on business litigation. Inmany law firms,
side.264
litigation
the
to
side
there has been a shift in power from the corporate
257.

HAECKEL,

supra note 240, at 122. Law firms are advised to follow the

compensation patterns of "the upper-tier accounting and consulting firms." Larry Smith,
Compensating Practice Team Leaders . . . New Competition Requires Fundamental
Readjustments, OF COUNSEL, Mar. 16, 1998, at 2, 2.
258.
DAWSON, supra note 54, at 154.
Temporal, supra note 251, at 67; see also David H. Maister, A Matter of
259.
Trust, AM. LAw., Jan.-Feb. 1998, at 34. Status also is involved, "[C]hances are, a partner
who heads an entire litigation department won't go quietly into a new role as 'team leader'
for litigation affecting segmented industries." Tripoli, supra note 248, at 7.
260.
Zeughauser, supra note 247, at 64. He continues: "Generally, funding the
additional compensation for nurturing the account requires phasing out the clientorigination portion of partner's compensation after a period of time." Id. Are such changes
confirmed by the Chicago Lawyers Project finding that law firms are re-organizing away
from "dominant seniors"? See Heinz et al., supra note 244, at 769 (industry groups and
client relations partners emerging within law firms are not noted).
Client revenues after deducting expenses can be divided between returns
261.
distributed within the firm and returns distributed by a determination of the source of the
client revenues.
See Amy Singer, Special Report: The Graying of the Bar, AM. LAW., June
262.
2000, at 87.
263.
Heinz et al., supranote 244, at 766-67.
See, e.g., Gail Diane Cox, LitigatorsManage?, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 13, 1998, at
264.
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Especially in established firms, litigation partners have their own battles with nonlitigation client finders.
2. SellingAdded Value: Services and Products
To sell client-focused legal services, two questions must be answered:
"What do our customers, both present and potential, want? How can we best
respond to their needs?"2 65 The answers to these two questions focus on law firm
contributions to either company processes or results.266 Law firms can embed their
knowledge in closer and deeper client relations and in products offered for sale.267
Selling added value through improving corporate processes, law firms
market their client relationships. Like other process consultants, the law firm
partner has "the chance to build up relationships at an individual level (because the
client and consulting team work closely together). In time, these personal
relationships grow, providing a bedrock of future client contacts. 268
Consider this anecdote. With respect to at least one outside firm, a client
demanded that the law firm eschew any, even unrelated, representation of
economic competitors. For this client, outsourcing's relational contracting "does
not dampen rivalry but instead shifts the playing field to sharp competition among
rival networks., 269 This client required, as a condition of their outsourcing, that the
law firm not serve rival networks in any way. When the subsidiary of an economic
rival approached a tax partner in the firm's East Coast office, the tax partner did a
conflicts check. As the work being done by his law firm's West Coast branch did
not create a legal conflict, the tax partner proceeded with the representation. A few
days later, a West Coast junior partner asked the East Coast tax partner to drop the
subsidiary. The junior partner told the East Coast partner that this client's minder
had told him that this client did not want the firm to assist any of its economic
rivals in any way. The East Coast partner contacted the West Coast's client's
finder who was surprised to learn of the promise not to assist the client's economic
rivals. Eventually, a compromise was worked out (with the client's consent) that
the tax partner could continue working on this matter, limiting it in ways that cost
the tax partner billable hours, but no further work was to be taken from the rival
(whom the tax partner was hoping would buy future services). In this incident, the
minder's power was basically affirmed, as was a conception of conflicts
responsive to the organizational changes discussed in this Article. 270 As important,

265.

HAECKEL, supra note 240, at 230.
266.
DAWSON, supra note 54, at xvi. Dawson says he expects "lawyers... to see
immediately the relevance and value of these ideas." Id. at xii.
267.
Id. at 41.
268.
CZERNIAWSKA, supra note 64, at 117. By contrast, in selling products, "the
relationship is very much between the client and the consulting firm as a whole." Id. There
is a sales transaction that may involve continuing relations, but the client is not buying a
relationship. Rather, the client is satisfying needs and taking hostage the reputation of the
law firm or other product seller. Id.
269.
Powell, supra note 14, at 59; see supratext accompanying notes 76-78.
270.
As there was no legal bar to the East Coast partner's work, the firm let a
current client restrict the firm's commitment to clients' rights to the lawyer of their choice.
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notice how the minder sold the client not only the law firm's legal expertise, but
also its business assistance.27'
Law firms also sell added value through improved corporate processes by
selling training. They depict themselves as outsourcing for a learning team:
Professional service firms can either try to hold onto their
knowledge, and perform 'black-box' services for their clients, or
they can proactively share their knowledge working with their
clients to create value. . . .The clients of professional service
providers are demanding not only real added value, but also respect.
. . . What is most valuable to clients is making them more
knowledgeable, helping them to make better decisions, and
enhancing their capabilities.272
"Empowered clients" is a poster carried by many corporate lawyers as
well as legal services and cause lawyers.273 Although outside "[lawyers are
usually very reluctant to enable their clients to take over any of their own
functions. . . . [I]t is increasingly common for [inside] corporate
counsel to
274
specifically request knowledge transfer from their legai firms.
Parallel to consulting finms designing for themselves (and their clients)
"client relationship partners," consulting firms' market strategy shifted to include
the sale of products.275 Consultants began to promise results.276 Selling products is
a means of promoting
outsourcing work. It implicitly tells the client that only
277
results are important.
Today, although "[p]roducts are still usually a small part of the client
offering... [t]he legal industry is making a concerted effort to 'productize' its
services., 278 That many law firms still shy away from marketing products may be
the consequence, not only of professional traditions, but also temporary market
conditions. Clients still repeatedly pay much of the production costs of the firm's
standard forms and procedures. Furthermore, if clients focused on law firms using
client work to develop standardized forms and procedures, through whose re-use
the law firm "also receives substantial value ... then the client may ... try[] to

271.
The Big 5 do not promise not to assist economic rivals. See supra text
accompanying note 73. But, consulting firms' market positions vary and teams innovate
taking advantage of various arbitrage possibilities.
272.
Asperger, supra note 244, at 1;see DAWSON, supra note 54, at ch.7.
273.
On legal services lawyers, see, for example, Louise G. Trubek, Poverty
Lawyering in a New Millennium, 17 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 461 (1998). On cause lawyers,
see Robert Eli Rosen, On the Social Significance of Critical Lawyering, 3 LEGAL ETHICS
169 (2001) (reviewing

CAUSE LAWYERING: POLITICAL COMMITMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL

RESPONSIBILITY (Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold
274.
DAWSON, supra note 54, at 53.

eds., 1998)).

275.
276.
277.

Czerniawski, supranote 64, at 25.
Id.
See supra text accompanying note 187.

278.

DAWSON, supra note 54, at 52. The amount of products being sold by

lawyers may be underestimated because historic professional regulation creates incentives
for lawyers to deny that they are being compensated for their products.
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renegotiate the relationship to more of an alliance-based
279 approach" thereby
seeking a share of the "product" created during the service.
Today, the explicit push is not to develop products, but to increase the use
of "value billing." 280 Like products, value billing makes compensation contingent
on producing results. In response to consulting firms selling products, the AICPA
(American Institute of Certified Public Accountants) ruled that when accountants
28
act as consultants "results should not be explicitly or implicitly guaranteed." '
Yet, consultants "all say that their clients are insisting on risk-sharing.... [t]hat's
just a euphemism for contingency billing or contingency payments. 282 Similarly,
while it is unprofessional for lawyers to promise results, 283 value-billing's
advocates insist that through value billing, in response to client demand, lawyers
are sharing in their client's risk that legal services will be of little benefit.284 Valuebilling's advocates usually do not discuss lawyer promises to corporate clients of
potential spectacular results that make the contingency payments acceptable.
As marketing strategies, providing services differ from selling products.
As organizational design strategies, they also differ. For example, product
development teams may emerge in law firms, as they have in the "intelligent
corporation" and consulting firms. 285 Law firms may offer to sell templates, tools,
methodologies, and so on.285 But in the redesigned company, the distinction
between selling services and products also blurs; when companies serve customers
by producing products that are particularly customized, the distinctions between
service industries and product manufacturers collapses.287

279.
Id. at 173.
280.
Steven T. Taylor, Billing Rate Survey... Is the Sky the Limit or is the Sky
About to Fall?,OF COUNSEL, Jan. 2001, at 1, 9; see also MAIsTER, supra note 32, at 196-97.

281.

Am. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCOUNTANTS, AICPA PROFESSIONAL
MS § 11.06 (2d vol. 1982) (Statement on Standards for Management Advisory
Services (SSMAS) No. 1. "Client Benefit") (SSMAS was replaced by Statements of
Standards for Consulting Services (CS) on Jan. 1, 1992). The Standard continues: "When
estimates of quantifiable results are presented, they should be clearly identified as estimates
and the support for such estimates should be disclosed." This qualification may swallow up
the reach of the language quoted in the text.
282.
O'SHEA & MADIGAN, supra note 42, at 296 (citations omitted) (giving an
example of Anderson Consulting linking their fee to the number of jobs eliminated as a
result of its consultation). Other examples are the tax products that investment banks,
accounting firms and law firms have been selling to their clients in which they collect a
percentage of the tax savings. Accounting firms argue these "value-based" fees are not
within the legal meaning of "contingency fees." For a discussion, see Sheryl Stratton, SEC

STANDARDS

Looks at the Sale ofAggressive Products to Audit Clients, TAX NOTES, Apr. 3, 2000, at 13-

16.
283.

See, e.g., MODELRULES, supra note 86, atR. 1.13, 7.1(b).

284.

Debra Baker, Who Wants to be a Millionaire?,86 A.B.A.J., Feb. 2000, at 36,

40.
For an alternative design, see infra text accompanying note 295.
285.
286.
MAISTER, supra note 32, at 94-95.
287.
"This trend was made clear in 1993, when Fortunemerged its traditionally
separate Top 500 rankings of industrial and service companies into a single list, implicitly
admitting it could not distinguish between the two groups." DAWSON, supra note 54, at 8-9.
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To understand the blurring of law firms providing services and selling
products, consider whether a tax "product" offered by a Big 5 consulting firm to a
company, developed from a review of the audit of that company, is a product or a
service. To call it a product, as the Big 5 prefer, primarily serves to disengage it
from the purchased audit.288 Similarly, consider a law firm that proposes a tax
shelter and provides an opinion letter that the tax shelter is legally acceptable. Is
this opinion letter a professional service, a sales document, or both?289 Or consider
an opinion letter that a law firm provides to an investment bank promoting a tax
shelter that is to be furnished to customers of the investment bank to encourage
them to participate in the shelter. Is this opinion letter, as the Tax Court and the
Third Circuit have said, "legal advice" or is it product promotional literature? 290 Or
consider the confusion about services and products of tax lawyers turned
investment bankers: "When I started out, I was the tax adviser.... Then I realized
my clients were getting their advice from the investment banks and accounting
firms and shelter promoters. I thought, I've lost my role." 291 What is this2 advisory
92
role? 'Executives now call us for product,' says one investment banker."
Too much can be made of the service/product distinction. Nonetheless,
some law firms have re-organized themselves to sell both products and services.
Since at least the early 1980s, lawyers have been saying they need to develop the
internal training activities of the Big 5.293 Freshfields has taken steps in that
direction by developing PSL's (Professional Support Lawyers) 294 who support
legal services by providing educational services, maintaining form files, and
finding new products. The PSL functions include "identify[ing] the latest marketdriven developments that will affect legal products, such as new types of bonds
and new project-financing methods" and contacting every Freshfields lawyer on a

288.

The alternative is:
co-creating knowledge with clients. The idea of co-creation epitomizes a
true partnership . . . [i]nvolving the client in the actual process of
knowledge creation means that it not only has the deepest possible
understanding of the knowledge being created, but also develops its own
abilities to create knowledge, as a very high level capability.
Id. at 171. In this sense, at least, selling products may derogate from client duties.
289.
Paul J. Sax, Shelters: Bringing Back Professionalism, TAX NoTES, Apr. 3,
2000, at 145 (arguing it is the sale of a product, especially when firm fees are contingent on
the tax savings).
290.
Lee A. Sheppard, Shelter Opinions: The Tax Equivalent of Pasties, TAx
NoTEs, Apr. 3, 2000, at 17 (considering ACM, concluding that it is not legal advice).
291.
Joseph Bankman, The New Market in Corporate Tax Shelters, TAX NoTEs,
June 12, 1999, at 1775, 1783.
292.
Id. at 1784.
293.
I was told this in the early 1980s by a few outside counsel, including a
former President of the ABA.
294.
Compare Freshfield with Ernst, which has a role it calls "knowledge
steward," who is "based at the client" selling and developing Ernst products and services as
the steward becomes more knowledgeable about the company. DAWSON, supra note 54, at
154. Ernst's model is more that of the client relationship partner.
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weekly basis and 295
asking "the question, 'What did you do this week that's of use to
somebody else?'
Changing demands for legal services in the redesigned company has
influenced, and likely will continue to influence, both what lawyers do and how
they are organized. Some inside and outside counsel have responded, and others
are likely to respond, to changing company demands. Both legal departments and
corporate law firms will be very different than they were in the 1980s. Some have
modeled themselves, and others are likely to model themselves, on what
management consultants prescribe as the best practices for departments and firms
supplying professional services.
V. CONCLUSION
"We're All Consultants Nowv" is a poster for two different and coexisting claims. First, organizational redesign means companies use all lawyers as
they use consultants. Companies treat inside counsel as inside consultants.
Companies treat law firms as .just one consulting finn among many.
,,296 The poster for
this movement is "Corporations Are Professional Service Finns.
Second, many
law organizations are engaged in organizational redesign, adopting the consulting
firm as the model. Legal departments 297 are redesigned to provide substitutes for
outsourced legal consultants and to provide consultants about whatever legal work
is outsourced. Law firns are adopting a best practices model in which law firms
redesign themselves to resemble other consulting firms. "Clients First, Adding
Value" is the poster for legal department and law firm redesign.
"We're All Consultants Now" is part of a larger imitative pattern:
Until recently, each of the professional service industries thought of
itself as distinct from others, and so looked primarily to its direct
peers and competitors in learning how to confront key business
challenges. Law firms studied other law firms, advertising agencies
tried to implement best practices in advertising, and engineering
firms looked within their own field for ideas and innovation.
This pattern is rapidly changing as professional service finms realize
not only that the fundamental nature of their businesses is the same
as those in other professional industries; but also that they are facing
essentially the same competitive pressures, and sometimes even the
same competitors. Given their common foundation, each
professional service industry has a tremendous opportunity to learn
from the methods of all other professional fields. From now on the

295.
Ritchenya Shepherd, Lawyers Who Don't Bill Clients, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 8,
1999, at A17. At one legal department, in 1994, weekly meetings were organized
specifically for that purpose. 1994 Interview, supra note 10.
296.
Inside counsel often stressed in my 1994 Interviews, as one put it, "lawyers
are like everyone else in management." Corporate employees, like a professional service
firm, are a collection of professionals. See 1994 Interview, supra note 10; supra text
accompanying note 28.
297.
And other places where lawyers work inside companies.
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greatest innovation in professional service firms will come from that
cross-pollination.298
As one law firm partner admitted, "There's so much law firms have to do
to catch up with the Big-5." 299 And some are trying, not only by trying to become
multidisciplinary themselves, but also, among other things, by creating industry
groups, client relationship partners, and products for sale. Not only do clients use
lawyers as consultants, but also lawyers themselves are choosing to act like
consultants.
[An] illustration is found in the arena of corporate finance and
mergers and acquisitions (M&A). The roles of investment bankers,
lawyers, and accountants in structuring and carrying out these
transactions were once fairly distinct. However, each of these
professional groups has endeavored to take larger roles in the
overall transaction, frequently making them direct competitors in
the same business. °0
I once argued that lawyers had a professional obligation to their
organizational clients to become "decision consultants., 30' By this I meant that
lawyers for organizations sometimes need to assist clients to secure accountable
internal decision processes.302 Lawyers add value to their clients when they ask if
the decision is being made at the proper level, with appropriate input, supervision,
and so on. More generally, the internal constitutional structure of the company, not
only its board structure, ought to be of concern to lawyers.
Instead of lawyers, management consultants have assumed this
jurisdiction. They are teaching companies how to make decisions. Companies are
implementing organizational strategies that result in, among other things, team
transactional control and executive control relegated to managing the company
"economy," including supervising risk-management reports. As this Article and
perhaps current corporate scandals suggest, the redesigned corporate
accountability structure is ridden with gaps.
Consultants are teaching companies how to use expert knowledge.
Company implementation of these process controls may create the future I have
described above. With consultants describing these best practices, it is of little
surprise that best practices for inside and outside counsel mirror those for lawyers
employed by consulting (professional service and multidisciplinary practice) firms.
All too often, "[t]alk of 'ethical dilemmas' diverts attention from the
structural conditions that have produced the problem in the first place."30 3 The
redesigned company's use of lawyers as consultants and lawyers modeling
themselves and their organizations on those of consultants may generate changed
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
538-50.
303.

DAwSON, supranote 54, at 32-33.

Tripoli, supranote 248, at 8.
DAwsON, supra note 54, at 35; see also MAISTER, supranote 32, at 150-52.
Rosen, Responsible Organization, supra note 4, at 217.
See, e.g., Rosen, Inside CounselMovement, supra note 4, at 525-26, 531-33,
DANIEL F. CHAMBLIss, BEYOND CARING: HOSPITALS, NURSES AND THE

SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF ETHICS

92 (1996).
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lawyer behaviors. As David Luban has warned: "As lawyers come to occupy roles
structurally similar to those of deal-makers and clients, it should not surprise us if
the lawyers' approach to the law swings increasingly into alignment with this
jaundiced view." 3°4 What can one expect from a future in which everyone
connected to the redesigned company, inside or outside, knows that the operating
rule is "you will be employed by us as long as you add value to the organization,
and you are continuously responsible for finding ways to add value"? 30 5
This need not be the future. Responses from law firms that immunize
their liabilities, however, will not prevent this future. What needs to be changed is
how companies use lawyers. If lawyers do not work to advance such change,
perhaps their clients will be forced to. Scandals may result in redesigned
organizations becoming "more centralized. 30 6 Redesigned companies may decide
that their organizational strategies need to be modified to reinvigorate bureaucratic
"command and control" systems. Such supplementation is not described in the
literature that I reviewed. 30 7 What the consultants are offering de-emphasizes
bureaucratic controls. They advocate using authority covertly, thus allowing
management to attain plausible deniability of how teams have "added value."
This need not be our future. But development of the Team Production
Model30 8 of corporate law will not prevent it, as long as the Team Production
Model remains focused on changes in the board of directors. This model, like
many others, 309 focuses on the top of the company. All these corporate law reform
agendas would be greatly strengthened if they paid more attention to empirical, not
theoretical, knowledge of company decision-making.310 Focusing on the board
304.

David Luban, No Rules?: ConsideringValues Asking the Right Questions, 72

TEMP. L. REv. 839, 841 (1999).
305.
Powell, supra note 14, at 57 (citation omitted).
306.
This is "the most drastic change" of Paul Volcker's report on Arthur
Anderson. Floyd Norris, Enron's Many Strands: The Accountants; Anderson Told to Split
Audits and Accounting, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 12, 2002, at Cl.

307.
The literature does discuss using information technology as a control
mechanism, through the increased use of record-keeping and the like. Cf. MICHEL
FOUCAULT,
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OF KNOWLEDGE AND THE DISCOURSE ON LANGUAGE

(1972).
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This model was first articulated in Margaret M. Blair and Lynn A. Stout, A
Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REv. 247 (1999); see also Kent
Greenfield, Using Behavioral Economics to Show the Power and Efficiency of Corporate
Law as a Regulatory Tool, 35 U.C. DAvIs L. REv. 581 (2002).
309.
See, e.g., Ira M. Millstein, Corporate Governance Symposium: Introduction
to the Report and Recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving the
Effectiveness of CorporateAudit Committees, 54 Bus. LAw. 1067 (1999).

310.
For example, a Team Production Model may argue that a progressive
company has a more independent board. Peter C. Konstant, Team Production and the
Progressive Corporate Law Agenda, 35 U.C. DAvIS L. REv. 667, 684-90 (2002). In

convincing research, however, James D. Westphal has found that CEOs successfully
respond to increased board independence. CEOs use Board independence to gain advantage
on matters like business strategy and CEO compensation. James D. Westphal, Board
Games: How CEOs Adapt to Increases in Structural Board Independence from

Management, 43 ADMIN. Sci. Q. 511 (1998); see also Jerilyn W. Coles et al., An
Examination of the Relationship of GovernanceMechanisms to Performance, 27 J. MGMT.
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assumes some sort of transmission belt up and down the company. It assumes that,
under the top, employees obey instructions and their compliance with instructions
can be reviewed.
The preceding analysis suggests these assumptions are no longer accurate.
At best, the top manages the economy, not the transactions that violate the law.
Delegatees exercise authority. At most, the top can say "innovate responsibly." But
norms of self-management create significant gaps in the transmission belt.
In the redesigned company, executives may announce ethics codes,
generalized rules of conduct, directions of all sorts, but not instructions.
Professionals, perhaps especially lawyers, as they are experienced in the gap
between the law on the books and the law in action, "will be quick to point out that
the firm's social proclamations represent mere lip service" if "specific procedures
and structures for implementing these goals throughout the enterprise" do not
accompany the pronouncements. 31' Professionals know that even in their firms,
which carry forward professional traditions, there exists large "uncertainty with
respect to what management values,' and
312 [there is reliance] on personal values in
lieu of organizational ethical culture.
This need not be our future, but recognizing that law firms sell products is
likely to be insufficient to prevent it. The Wisconsin School 313 has argued that
many contracts are products and product safety regulations for contracts need to be
instituted. If the distinctions between legal services and products are increasingly
blurring, applying product safety regulations to legal work becomes increasingly
even may be necessary, but the prospects for their
attractive. Such regulations
3 14
implementation are slim.
A supply-side response would protect intellectual property rights in legal
services/products. As one lawyer ruefully told me, "A third-rate engineer is
remembered by those plaques on bridges ... but a lawyer's life is hidden in old
never-seen papers." For the sake of the development of our "mysterious
science, ' 31 5 these property rights need to be non-exclusive rights. They also need
to be non-exclusive for client protection purposes; the sale by law and accounting

Donald C. Langevoort, The Human Nature of CorporateBoards: Law, Norms and the
Unintended Consequences of Independence and Accountability, 89 GEO. L.J. 797 (2001).
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311.
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towards consistency with the views of those to whom they are accountable if those views
are known."); see also MAIsTER, supra note 32, at ch. 8. As a General Counsel told me,
"ethics handbooks don't get into the fabric of the company." 1994 Interview, supra note 10.
313.
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firms of "Black Boxes ' 31 6 is improper. There is a name for sellers of secret curesquacks. The public needs protection from quacks. Intellectual property law (and
product safety regulations) could shape the products lawyers sell. The ability to
license products, for example, could induce lawyers to publicize the "innovations"
they make in client service.
This need not be our future, but to prevent it we need to understand better
how lawyers act in the redesigned company. What problems are caused by its
structure for using legal services? How do lawyers play on company teams? In
regard to legal work, how are authority and accountability exercised in the
redesigned company? 317 In regard to legal work, what issues are neither addressed
nor responded to by lawyers when they take assignments from the redesigned
company? How are legal departments, outside law firms, and lawyers responding
to the changes described above?
In this future, lawyers, legal departments, and outside law firms are
similar organizationally to consultants and their organizations. We need to learn
whether lawyers act like other consultants. We need to know whether authority
and accountability are exercised within legal departments and law firms as they are
in other professional service firms.
The lawyering process, to a great extent, is open and contingent. 318 Both
the shape of lawyer discretion and how it is exercised are problematic. Especially
in legal practice, ethical issues are presented "in situations of high ambiguity"
where there is "a hell lot more gray than black and white."3 9 "Individuals and
groups have to make decisions in a highly complex context where roles and norms,
authority and power relationships, competitive
pressures, profit motives, and
320
organizational structures all come into play."
The goal of publishing in law reviews analyses of lawyer behavior and
changes in the legal profession, I believe, is to give lawyers tools with which to be
responsive to, not determined by, contexts. 32' This Article, unfortunately, does not
provide such tools. 322 This Article is a warning about the need to develop such
tools. Further research needs to be done to reveal the tools lawyers can use to
respond to these organizational changes.
316.
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